Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

5-5-2007

Economic freedom and social capital determinants on economic
growth of developed and developing nations
Debjani Chakrabarti

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Chakrabarti, Debjani, "Economic freedom and social capital determinants on economic growth of
developed and developing nations" (2007). Theses and Dissertations. 1623.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/1623

This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CAPITAL DETERMINANTS ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING NATIONS

By
Debjani Chakrabarti

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Sociology
in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work

Mississippi State, Mississippi
May 2007

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CAPITAL DETERMINANTS ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
NATIONS

By
Debjani Chakrabarti

Approved:

_________________________
James D. Jones
Professor of Sociology
(Director of Dissertation)

_________________________
Troy C. Blanchard
Assistant Professor of Sociology
(Committee Member)

_________________________
Domenico Parisi
Associate Professor of Sociology
(Committee Member)

_________________________
Jon P. Rezek
Assistant Professor of Finance
and Economics
(Committee Member)

_________________________
Duane A. Gill
Professor of Sociology
(Committee Member)

_________________________
Xiaohe Xu
Graduate Coordinator of the
Department of Sociology,
Anthropology and Social Work

_________________________
Philip B. Oldham
Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

Name: Debjani Chakrabarti
Date of Degree: May 5, 2007
Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Sociology
Major Professor: James D. Jones
Title of Study: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CAPITAL DETERMINANTS
ON ECONOMIC GROWTH OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
NATIONS
Pages in Study: 157
Candidate for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

This dissertation explores the determining effects of non-economic factors on
economic growth of developed versus developing nations. While earlier economic
theories have traditionally focused on land, labor, capital and technology as the principle
determining factors of economic growth, latter-day normative theorists demonstrated the
importance of cultural forces and human capital variables on economic growth of nations.
This dissertation is an extension of this emphasis put on economic growth by the latterday normative theorists.
Economic activities for developed and developing nations have been used as a
proxy stock variable (for economic growth) for three points in time – 1980, 1990 and
2000. The data for economic activities has been obtained from Jerry Dwyer’s dataset
while the independent variables such as economic freedom has been obtained from the
Fraser Institute and that of social capital variables have been obtained from the World
Values Survey for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. The central focus of the research has
been to observe the correlations between the several components of economic freedom

and social capital variables (such as trust and membership) among developed and
developing nations followed by multiple regression analyses of the economic freedom
and social capital variables on economic growth of developed and developing nations.
The findings of this research suggest that physical capital and economic freedom
and unequivocally significant determinants of economic growth in both the developed
and developing nations. Trust on the other hand has been understood to be a limited
variable in the way it is conceptualized in the World Values Survey. Within this
limitation, ‘personal trust’ has been found to be declining over the years for all the
nations, has very little association with membership categories over the years and is
negatively correlated with economic activities/economic growth or output per worker.
The impact of membership or belongingness on economic activities is very different in
developed versus developing countries.
Overall, this research has helped to broaden the boundaries of economic growth
with the extension of sociological variables (such as trust and membership) into the field
of Economics. The research has broad-based implications on the public policies of
government across nations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Backdrop: The field of Economic Sociology
The intellectual tradition that subsumes the research discussion of this dissertation
is broadly the field of Economic Sociology. I shall briefly elaborate on the scope of
Economic Sociology to situate the research topic under study. Economic Sociology is a
field of inquiry which pertains to economic and sociological variables as they relate to
each other. Incorporation of economic variables in sociological discussions of the
division of labor in the transformation of societies, the role of means and modes of
production in the formation of class interests, the role of religious values in shaping and
sustaining capitalism are fairly well-established themes running through the lineage of
founding predecessors in Sociology. Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber
succinctly drew upon the social and economic ties of recurrent generalized phenomena
and trends. A similar but more elaborate version is “the application of the frames of
reference, variables and explanatory models of sociology to that complex of activities
concerned with the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of scarce goods
and services” (Smelser 1963, pp 27-28). The interests of economic sociology are also a
part and parcel of the writings of Talcott Parsons and Karl Polyani. In the words of
Joseph Schumpeter, a leading economic sociologist deeply influenced by Weber,
1

“Economic Sociology” denotes the “description and interpretation – or “interpretative
description” – of economically relevant institutions, including habits and all forms of
behavior in general, such as government, property, private enterprise, customary or
“rational” behavior. By “economics” – or, if you prefer, “economics proper” – we denote
the interpretative description of the economic mechanisms that play within any given
state of those institutions, such as market mechanisms” (Schumpeter [1949] 1989, pp
293). Drawing on these definitions, we can see the sociological traditions that have
crisscrossed the behavioral and institutional aspects of economics to create a new
interface of Economic Sociology. Similarly, in the recent times, pure economics has
embraced the role of cultural institutions and behavior to explain economic phenomena
such as growth and development. The field of “Social Economics” in this sense is very
similar, although not technically interchangeable, to the interests and foci of Economic
Sociology.
Another point of evident clarification that needs to be made in the field of
Economic Sociology is that like any other field or sub-discipline of Sociology, this area
entails a pluralistic approach, a complementary articulation and a broad-based,
multidisciplinary attitude. Although for the purpose of disciplinary elitism, theoretical
positions do diverge according to the topic in focus between Sociology and Economics, it
does not exclude collaboration and interpretation of “social facts” from a synthetic
perspective. In other words, there is no single dominant tradition of theoretical vantage in
the field of Economic Sociology, rather, the complexity of determinants bearing on every
kind of economic phenomena make it imperative that there be a greater utility of
approaches that are less monolithic. This is important to mention simply to avoid
2

confusion when dispersed literature on the topic under study, which may seem otherwise
contradictory, are infused to triangulate and understand the consequences of social
behavior on economic institutions and vice versa. The research problem that will be
explored in this dissertation emanates out of the field of Sociology and the field of
Economics and utilizes important concepts and theoretical perspectives from both these
field of social sciences.

Introduction of the Research Problem
Situated within the broad framework of Economic Sociology, the research topic in
this dissertation is exploration of the relationship between economic freedom, social
capital and economic growth in developed and developing countries. The key exploration
in this research will be to navigate the relationship between economic freedom and social
capital and the determining effects of each of these two variables and their interaction on
the neo-classical Solow economic growth model. The most recent literature on growth
has postulated a few strong correlations and two-way causality between economic
freedom and growth based on a variety of causality tests of economic freedom measures
(Gwartney and Lawson, 2001). It has been shown that the overall level of economic
freedom appears to cause growth, while changes in freedom are jointly determined with
growth. Similarly, the role of social capital on economic growth is arguably strong. It has
been posited that good social capital has strong determining effect on economic growth.
Very recent literature on cultural aspects of growth has argued the role of cultural ethics
and cultural values in an evolutionary continuum to arrive at economic-cultural models of
growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1994). However, in past researches, the neo-classical Solow
3

model has not been used as the point of reference to extend the model further including
social capital and economic freedom variables. It is assumed that growth measured
simply by per capita income regressed on primary determinants of land, labor, capital and
technology could very well vary with the inclusion of social capital and economic
freedom variables. While many endogenous and exogenous variables have been added to
growth models over time, the relationship between economic freedom and social capital
and their singular and joint variation on the factors of neo-classical Solow growth model
has not been explored.
The exploration of the concept of social capital and its relationship with the
factors of economic freedom is the central challenge in this research. As most of the
studies on the relationship between economic freedom and growth has led to the
conclusions of some correlation and some causalities between economic freedom and
growth, this research will focus on how freedom affects social capital and vice versa and
how the interaction of components of each of these affect economic growth of nations.
In the sections that follow, I shall provide a brief coverage of the concepts of
economic freedom, social capital and economic growth and the importance and
justification of pursuing research in this particular realm. In the preliminary discussion of
all the concepts, the philosophical foundations of the concepts will be expalined as well
as the complexity involved in measuring them in objective terms.

Economic Freedom, Social Capital and Economic Growth
The first concept – the concept of economic freedom is complex and
multidimensional. In the words of J. Gwartney and Robert Lawson, who are the first
4

extensive researchers on this topic, economic freedom is a country-level concept. The
chief ingredients that determine the economic freedom of a country are “personal choice,
voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and protection of persons and property. When
economic freedom is present, the choices of individuals will decide what and how goods
and services are produced….Personal ownership of self is an underlying postulate of
economic freedom” (2003, 19, p 406). These scholars continue to emphasize the role of
institutions and values (like effective democracy) which enhance economic freedom.
Scholars of economic freedom emphasize that institutional policies promote economic
freedom when they successfully build the infrastructure for voluntary exchange
protecting individuals and property from “violence, coercion, and fraud” in public life.
Institutions and policies are considered to maintain economic freedom when governments
of countries are able to promote economic freedom through a legal structure and a law
enforcement system protecting the property rights of owners and enforcing contracts in
terms of a fair justice system. They also enhance economic freedom when they facilitate
access to sound money. In some cases, the government itself provides a currency of
stable value. In other instances, the government simply removes obstacles which interfere
with the use of sound money that is provided by others, including private organizations
and other governments (Gwartney, 2004).
Although the concepts of economic freedom and social capital have never been
inter-related, it is helpful, for the purpose of this research to understand the link between
the two in terms of institutional resources. According to Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant
(1992, p.119), “social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to
an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less
5

institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. Social capital
refers to cooperative social relationships for the realization of cooperative goals. Social
capital depends on properties of the social structure, in particular “closure of social
networks, continuity of social relations, and multiplexity of relations” (Coleman 1994, p
170). In other words, social capital is a form of ‘capital’ which inheres in social
relationships generating a ‘public good’ effect among its members. The “embeddedness”
of economic concepts (of investment and profit) in stable social relations is one of the
important ways to understand the rationale behind the social capital concept (Granovetter
1973).
Economic growth is a key concept in the literature of Development Economics.
Economic growth is also the dependent variable in this research. In the discovery phases
of literature on economic growth, the latter was understood mostly as a function of
physical aspects of growth like investment, savings and the like. It was only in the later
phases of research on economic growth that indicated growth was not simply a function
of physical capital but other resource variables like educational infrastructure, cultural
capital, social relationships, technological improvements and many other factors not
captured either by the early models or the latter neo-classical models of economic
growth. It was the path-breaking economic growth model developed by Robert Solow
that first incorporated the factor of technological changes into an existing economic
growth model and was suggestive of including other social-cultural factors which would
account for growth unexplained by economic variables.
The current research stems from the research suggestions of neo-classical growth
theorists as Robert Solow, Paul Romer, Sala-i-Martin and the like who have explored and
6

suggested the inclusion of important socio-cultural factors to explain neo-classical growth
model. Therefore, this research builds on the model developed by Robert Solow – in this
sense, it is an extension of the Solow economic growth model including two new
independent variables, economic freedom and social capital to account for economic
growth in developed and developing countries. The growth pattern of developed
countries is arguably different from that of the developing countries, so testing the
models of growth for these two sets of countries with the inclusion of two new variables
would be suggestive of how these variables work for the developed versus the developing
nations.
The layout of this dissertation is arranged in chapters. Chapter I introduces the
research problem, the backdrop of the research problem and the main ideas connected
with this research. Chapter II is an extensive literature review on the research surrounding
economic freedom, social capital and economic growth and the ways in which this
research ties into these concepts theoretically. Chapter III is the section on methodology
which discusses the data sources for the current research describing the variables used,
the construction of these variables, the hypotheses used in this research and the data
assembling process including the extraction of the data in usable form for this research.
Chapter IV is a chapter on the descriptive statistics of the data and correlation results of
the independent variables for three years with 10-years interval as 1980, 1990 and 2000.
Chapter V explores the bivariate correlations between the independent and the dependent
variables for the developed versus the developing countries, then discusses the regression
results for developed and developing countries. Lastly, the hypotheses formulated in the
third chapter are explained from the research results of the correlations and the regression
7

analyses. Chapter VI focuses on the analyses and explanation of the results of this
research. This chapter summarizes both the unique findings of this research and
elaborates on the continuity of findings from previous researches on this topic. The
importance of this research is discussed in the last chapter, the shortcomings of the
research are illuminated and explained and suggestions for further research are made in
the areas of economic freedom, social capital and economic growth.

8

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In this section I will discuss the historical-theoretical background of the ideas of
economic freedom and social capital followed by a discussion of the empirical research
exploring 1) the relationship between economic freedom and growth, 2) social capital and
growth. After coverage of this literature, I will attempt to link the ideas of economic
freedom and social capital as they relate to growth. In past research, these two concepts
have not been used concomitantly to determine their effects on growth. What I purport to
do here is to make intuitive connections between these two ideas at the interface of
sociology and economics to theoretically explore their relevance for growth. The
construction of intuitive linkages shown through various research will additionally clarify
the derivation of the research questions and hypotheses outlined in the methodology
section.

The Context of Economic Freedom and Significant Research
It is primarily in the context of understanding the market-state relationship for the
prospects of economic growth that there has been a surge of vast literature in the area of
economic freedom. Scholars have argued that any construction of a measure of economic
freedom should include the extent to which rightly acquired property is protected and
9

individuals are free to engage in voluntary transactions. These elements clearly show an
important role for the government. In an economically free society, de Hann (2003)
specifically indicates that the crucial responsibility of the government is to ensure the
protection of private property and contractual agreements. In this context, governments
can fail to ensure optimum economic freedom by over-regulation and taxation of an
economy. Therefore, a government of a country can either promote economic freedom or
sabotage the interests of its people by neglecting the establishment of economic freedom.
The concept of economic freedom encompasses several important aspects of a
country’s economic market. This includes duty-free, little capital control, and fair rule of
the law, just to mention a few. There are several countries that have embraced the general
notions of economic freedom. For instance, Hong Kong and Singapore are two
exemplary examples of successful promotion of economic freedom. Both countries have
used policies such as free trade, simple procedure for starting businesses, strong property
rights, and foreign investment to stimulate economic growth. Similarly, Luxembourg has
promoted economic freedom through the encouragement of foreign investment. Research
also shows that when countries fail to embrace the notion of economic freedom, they are
the least likely to experience economic growth. For example, Haiti is a country with a
corrupt government that undermines the emergence of economic freedom, therefore
undermining economic growth (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003).
For economic freedom to emerge, a country must promote both political freedom
and civil liberties. Political freedom is important for a democratic process that includes
all parties in the decision-making process. Civil liberties, on the other hand, are important
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because they involve citizens in the process of economic growth by assuring that equity
of resources and growth are distributed according to the market rules.
For a country to enjoy the benefits of economic freedom, political freedom and
civil liberties must coexist. There can be situations where there is substantial political
freedom present in a country that limits economic freedoms of individuals through
excessive tax and spending pushed to a high level. Contrarily, there can be situations
where there is high economic freedom for privileged class in a country ruled chiefly by a
military dictatorship. The point emphasized here is that while political freedom and civil
liberties generally go hand-in-hand with higher economic freedom for greater economic
growth, the presence of one does not necessarily mean the obvious presence of the other.
The concept of economic freedom in the context discussed above is strongly suggestive
of some basic protective rights of people with a degree of governmental interference to
ensure the maintenance of such rights. In an economically free society, de Hann and
Sturm (2003: 550) specifically indicate that the fundamental function of the government
is:
the protection of private property and the enforcement of contracts. When a
government fails to protect private property, takes property itself without full
compensation or establishes restrictions that limit voluntary exchange, it violates
the economic freedom of its citizens.
It must be understood that the concept of economic freedom and the formulation
of its objective rationale are inextricably linked with the subjective criteria of “freedom”
in general, of which it is a fragment. When we speak of economic freedom, we
correspondingly imply institutional arrangements that do not restrain trade or increase
transaction costs or weaken property rights or individual incentives to productive
11

activities. It is in this sense that Amartya Sen (1993) talks of economic freedom as having
both a “process” and an “opportunity” aspect to it. Sen (2000: 36) describes this as:
constitutive role of freedom relates to the importance of substantive freedom in
enriching human lives. The substantive freedoms in everyday life include
elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation,
undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the
freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political
participation and uncensored speech and so on.
The “process” aspect of economic freedom refers to the autonomy of decisions
without constraints or impediments. Simply, this means that individuals have personal
agency and efficacy that allow the individuals to have the ability to decide without
influence, interference and punitive measures. People act under the pursuit of personal
and collective interest.
Kenneth Arrow (1951) discusses preference ordering as a function of values of
the self rather than of the tastes. One may have a taste for pompousness but must have the
“preference freedom” to use his wealth for donating to community projects or paying for
a political entourage for a campaign. If the government stands in the way, it weakens the
ability of individuals to make willful or free decisions on their own and therefore
interferes in individual decision-making which is the very essence of economic freedom.
Every aspect of economic freedom is important for long-term economic growth.
Short-term fluctuations in growth rates may be influenced by a number of largely random
factors such as business cycle conditions and changes in the world price of import or
export items. But in the long run, economic growth generating development can only be
promoted and sustained under the rule of governments emerging from economic freedom.
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James Gwartney and Robert Lawson (2003: 5) argue that the maintenance over a
lengthy period of time of institutions and policies consistent with economic freedom is a
major determinant of current cross-country differences in per capita GDP. Related to this
argument is the position that economic freedom enhances the opportunities for both
investment and the productivity of investment by removing controls and regulatory
boundaries associated with investment for economic growth. Observing closely the
indicators of economic freedom (Table 1, chapter 3), one can surmise that economic
freedom is a unified concept at the institutional level affecting long-term institutional
changes rather than short-term random factor changes. It is for this reason that the
concept of economic freedom has become crucially important in public policy and
economic growth literature in the post-World War II economies.
From an analytical perspective, the challenge with the concept of economic
freedom is the accuracy of its operationalization. The concept includes many dimensions
that require the development of a complex index, including qualitative as well as tangible
aspects of economic freedom. In constructing a composite index, the three major
problems faced are: a) the elements that should be taken into account, b) the ways in
which to quantify them, c) the ways in which to combine them into a systematic index
(Gwartney et al. 1996).
After taking into account all the complexities associated with the understanding
and the measure of the concept of economic freedom, one of the most successful
measures of economic freedom that has been developed is by the Fraser Institute located
in Canada. Gwartney et al. (1996) have chosen seventeen measures of economic freedom
and rate a number of countries on each of these measures on a scale of 0-10, in which
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zero means that a country is completely unfree and ten means that it is completely free.
The seventeen measures are in four broad areas: 1) money and inflation, 2) government
operations and regulations, 3) “takings” and discriminatory taxation, 4) international
exchange (Gwartney et al. 1996). The components in the monetary area reflect the
availability of sound money to the citizens of a country. The components in the
institutional base reflect the dynamics of sound markets and governmental operations
acting in conjunction without inhibiting each other. The fourth area of the economic
freedom index is designed to measure the degree to which governments treat individuals
equally rather than discriminate them and impose taxes. Finally, the components in the
international category are designed to measure the policies consistent with free trade
(Gwartney et al., 1999).
In the 2001 version of Economic Freedom in the World, a first attempt was made
to supplement the more or less objective elements of the index with information from
various surveys. In the 2002 version of the report, again a number of changes were
introduced with respect to the elements making up the index as well as the chosen
aggregation procedures. As Gwartney and Lawson (2002) explain, important elements of
economic freedom are difficult to capture with objective measures particularly those
dealing with property rights and regulatory restraints. Thus survey data on legal structure
and government regulations are taken into consideration and the most recent version of
the index simply consists of a non-weighted average of all the components. Despite the
various changes, the rank correlations of the various editions of the economic freedom
index of the Fraser Institute are fairly high.
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Following the implementation of the Fraser Institute index, a number of studies
have been done to analyze the relationship between economic freedom and economic
growth of countries. Most of these studies have employed the cross-country (or panel)
growth models. The first major cross-country panel data in support of the view that
economic freedom causes more growth is found in the works of Dawson (1998) and
Gwartney et al. (1999) which shows significant results for period between 1975-1990.
However, with the later use of the Granger causality tests to address the issues of
causality in the relationship between various measures of economic freedom and growth,
Dawson (2003) show that “the overall level of economic freedom appears to cause
growth, while changes in freedom are jointly determined with growth. Among the
underlying areas of economic freedom, levels of freedom relating to use of markets and
property rights appear to be driving the causal relationship between economic freedom
and growth” (2003, p. 493). Two other important conclusions of the Dawson study are
that the long-run effects of economic freedom are more effective in increasing investment
than growth, and economic freedom’s role in affecting growth sharply increases with the
inclusion of the measures of political and civil liberty. In the later phases of studies of
cross-country differences in growth conducted by Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson
(2004), they offer an unique approach to quantify the quality of institutions which
constitute the economic freedom standings of countries. Their estimates indicate that a
one-unit increase in the long-term economic freedom ratings of countries is associated
with a 2.16 percentage point increase in investment as a share of GDP and a 1.24
percentage point increase in the annual growth of capital per worker. Thus institutional
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quality, as measured by the economic freedom ratings of countries impact both incomedifferences and long-term growth rates.
While the comprehensive concept of economic freedom ratings has been used to
estimate growth in cross-country panel studies, certain selected components of economic
freedom have also been singled out to test their effects on long-term growth of countries.
As the intervention of the state is a very significant component of the economic freedom
indicators, scholars have directed their research to the importance of the role of the state
in rapid economic growth of the Asian Tigers in the period following 1970. In this
regard, the results of the Dawson study have been reinforced by the findings of Paldam
(2003) in the context of Asian Tigers. Paldam (2003) argue that protected property rights,
freedom of trade and the role of public interventions are important factors in the rapid
economic successes of these countries. In a similar way, De Haan (2003) argues the
extent to which liberalization is furthered by the democratic aspects of a country. The
results of his analyses, both for cross-sectional as well as panel estimation procedures
indicate that between 1975 and 1990, liberalization and economic growth have been
significantly affected by the level of political freedom granted by political institutions of
a country.
Many other scholars have focused on the question of the ties between political
and judicial aspects of economic freedom for the prospects of growth in nations. There
are arguments for two different views in this field. Some observers like Fernandez and
Rodrik (1991), Fidrmuc (2000) have argued that an authoritarian regime is initially
needed for introducing successful reform policies in nations. Referring to the experiences
of Chile, South Korea and Taiwan, they argued that their economic successes are
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explained by their introduction of democracy only after successful economic reforms.
They argue that economic liberalization which furthers growth in the long-term are often
halted by political backlashes within democratic systems, hence long-term growth needs
to begin with authoritarian regimes followed by stages of democracy.
The opponents of this view like Przeworski and Limongi (1993), De Haan and
Siermann (1996) Rodrik (2000) argue that democracy establishes the best institutions for
conflict resolutions regarding an independent legal system, trade barriers, property rights,
access to sound money which are the dynamics involved in furthering economic freedom
for long-term growth. A study by Verwimp (2003) on the study of coffee trade,
dictatorship, genocide and growth in Rwanda demonstrates that personal consumption of
political power is the highest in dictatorship regimes which goes into crises as the
economy opens up to international trade. In a period of short-term economic growth, the
producer price of coffee increases as does dictatorship and political loyalties while over
the long-term, the producer price of coffee drops, economic growth fails and export of
coffee comes to be substituted by increasing debt to foreign aid.
Scholars of economic freedom have also distinguished between institutions of
English and American freedom, the former based on the independence of judges from
political interference in the administration of justice while the latter based on restriction
of judges in administration of justice through constitutional review. They found that the
English freedom was better suited to the concept of economic freedom than the American
freedom. One interesting twist in understanding the institutional quality aspects of
economic freedom on growth are studies demonstrating incidence of corruption,
openness to trade, quality of the bureaucracy, quality of the legal systems as principal
17

determinants of long-term economic growth. In the context of transitional Russia, Levin
and Satarov (2000) argue that the underdeveloped body of legislative procedures leading
to corruption significantly lowered its economic growth.
Many scholars have argued that it is not simply economic freedom that promotes
growth but the interplay of economic freedom with other factors which is responsible for
long-term growth. In a study by Bengoa (2003) using panel data for a sample of eighteen
Latin American countries for the period of 1970-1999, the interplay between economic
freedom and foreign direct investment on economic growth indicate that in the host
country, economic freedom is a positive determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows. Since foreign direct investment in positively related with economic growth in the
host countries, and economic freedom determines foreign direct investment, economic
freedom affects economic growth through the intermediate variable of FDI inflows. Other
recent studies addressing the impact of FDI on economic growth in LDCs suggest that the
economic growth of LDCs depend on their ability to absorb and make sound use of FDI
inflows with the level of human capital in the country (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994. De
Mollo, 1999. Obwona, 2001). Bengoa's research suggests that economic freedom
enhances long-term economic growth in LDCs by two channels - directly by means of the
degree and level of politico-economic stability of institutions and indirectly, by FDI
inflows.
The main problem associated with the models of economic freedom and growth is
the problem of outliers and parameters. Even if the level of economic freedom is not
directly related to growth in cross-country growth models, it may affect variables that in
turn influence economic growth. Scully (2001) argues that economic freedom not only
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stimulates economic growth but it fosters equality which in turn, contributes to growth. In
many cases, economic freedom influences growth while in many other cases, economic
growth lead to characteristics that increase economic freedom. In an article by Leo Kaas
(2003), the findings suggest that the country’s growth rate is affected by public policy
which is a direct outcome of the economic freedom areas of 2 and 3 as was discussed in
the Gwartney specification of the indicators i.e. 2) government operations and
regulations, 3) “takings” and discriminatory taxation. Table 1 is a summary outline of the
major

studies

done

directly

relationship of economic freedom and economic growth.
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assessing
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Table 1: Modified table of Jacob De Haan’s summary chart of studies on the relationship
between economic freedom and growth
Study
Scully &
Slottje
(1991)

Indicator used
Own index

De Vanssay Index of Scully
& Spindler & Slottje (1991)
(1994)
Islam
(1996)

Countries
144

100

Period
Method
1950-1985 Correlation

1985-1988

OLS
control
variables

Easton & Walker
94 and 1980-1992 OLS with
(1992)
subgroups
GNP per
capita & growth

Hanke
Fraser, Heritage &
29 & full 1996
& Walters Freedom House
samples survey
(1997)
Gwartney et al(1996)

OLS with
GNP per capita

Easton &
Walker
(1997)
De Haan &
Siermann
(1998)

Gwartney et al
(1996)
Index of Scully
& Slottje (1991

57

1975-1985

OLS with
GNP
per capita

78

1980-1992

Extreme
bounds
analysis
(EBA)
OLS with
13 elements
of index

Ayal &
Karras
(1998)

Gwartney et al
(1996)

58

1975-1990

Dawson
(1998)

Gwartney et al
(1996)

85

1975-1990

De Haan
& Sturm
(2000)

Gwartney et al
(1996)

80

Cross-country
& panel model

1975-1990

EBA

Results
Significant
relationship with
GDP and growth
Significant
relation with
GDP per capita
Freedom
indicator signif.
but results differ
for countries
Signif. relation
with all freedom
indicators
Signif. relation with
economic freedom
Outcomes depend
on which index of
Scully & Slottje used
6 components have
significant effect
on eco. growth
Level & change
have signif. effect
Only change in
freedom is robustly
related to growth

Heckelman
& Stroup
(2000)

Index based on
Gwartney et al.
(1996)

49

1980-1990

OLS Difference in eco. freedom
between nations can explain
half of variation in growth

Sturm &
De Haan
(2001)

Gwartney et al.
(1996)

80

1975-1990

robust Only change in freedom
estimators
is robustly related
to economic growth

Pitlik
(2002)

Fraser 2001 index 80

1975-1995

Carlsson
Fraser 2000 index 74
& Lundstrom
(2002)
Leertouwer
et al.(2002)

Gwartney et al.
(1996)

49

EBA Volatility of liberalization
has negative impact, level
and change related to growth
but level not very robust
1975-1995
EBA
Only variables positive
and robust with growth are
legal structure, private ownership
& freedom to use alternative currency
1980-1990
EBA
Only change in econ.
freedom related to growth
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The Context of Social Capital and Significant Research
Before beginning to explore the introductory ideas about the relationship between
social capital and economic growth, it is important to outline the concept of “social
capital”. Group-level approaches have garnered considerable interest in recent years as
scholars have introduced the concept of “social capital” to help explain the differential
capacity of human communities to solve a wide range of collective problems. The
economist Glenn Loury (1977) introduced the concept of social capital to designate a set
of “intangible resources” in families and communities that help to promote development
but Pierre Bourdieu (1984) was the first social scientist to point out its broader relevance
to human society.
The two key figures to conceptualize the dimensions of social capital in the field
of American Sociology are James Coleman (1988) and Robert Putnam (1993). According
to Putnam (2000), the earliest use of the term social capital was made by Hanifan who
included “good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals
and families who make up a social unit” in his conceptualization. Hanifan suggested that
an absence or presence of these elements in relationships affects the areas of social
capital of individuals and communities. Others (for example, Paxton 1999) cite Jacobs
(1961) and Loury (1977) as having employed the term prior to introduction into popular
use by Bourdieu (1984) and Coleman (1988).
Contemporary research and theory on social capital in the sociology literature
draws heavily on the work of James S. Coleman (1990). Coleman distinguishes social
capital by its function - social capital is “created when the relations among persons
change in ways that facilitate action” (1990, pp 304). Accordingly, social capital is not a
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“single entity” but encompasses different aspects of social structure that foster individual
and collective action (ibid. pp 302). By its very function, social capital is different and
distinguishable from both physical capital and human capital.
Social capital differs from physical capital in that it is not embodied in material
form, and it differs from human capital in that it does not derive from personal qualities.
The distinctive feature of social capital is that it is “embodied in the relations among
persons” (304, original emphasis). The three primary forms of social capital that Coleman
discusses are: obligations and expectations, information channels, and social norms.
Social capital inheres in social relationships and the advantage of such social
relationships and network based activities is that they create a myriad social infrastructure
as in informal social resources for job creation, occupational mobility, social credit
building for joint economic activities.
While Coleman focuses primarily on the potential benefits of social capital for
individual actors, political scientists have conceptualized social capital as a property of
collectivities – “towns, cities, and even entire nations” (Portes 1998, pp 18). The most
influential advocate of this approach to social capital is Robert Putnam (1993,1995. see
Jackman & Miller 1998, for a review). According to Putnam, social capital refers to
“features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action
and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1993, pp. 35). This approach to social capital
includes two features of collectivities - the degree of interpersonal trust and the level of
civic engagement. A trustworthy social environment is one in which persons are ready to
assume obligations towards others and expect others to fulfill their obligations towards
them. Under such conditions, people are encouraged to work together for shared purposes
22

(Hearn 1997 pp. 97). Fukuyama (1995) argues that generalized trust in social
relationships promote “spontaneous sociability” which he considers to be the most useful
form of social capital.
As follows from above, the perspectives of Coleman and Putnam on social capital
as key figures in social capital theory focus on slightly different aspects of social capital.
Coleman’s work primarily focuses on the vertical associations which constitute social
capital. Following Coleman’s rationale, social capital encompasses two features of social
organizations: a) the type of social structure and b) the coordination among actors. For
these two features to exist, organizations and communities must share common goals.
Coleman argues that in order to gain interests, actors engage in exchanges and transfer of
resources through networks, relationships and organizations endowing members with
credits to be utilized after investment. Coleman (1990) illustrates this point by using the
examples of how clandestine groups among South Korean students (p. 302) or workers’
cells in the pre-Revolutionary communist movement in Russia not only provided social
capital for individual participants, but constituted social capital for the oncoming
revolutionary movements themselves.
While Coleman’s work highlights the vertical associations among social actors in
the creation of social capital, Putnam’s work focuses on the “horizontal associations”
between people in the formation of social networks. Putnam’s work on participation in
voluntary organizations in the United States strongly reflects the use of this perspective.
He argues that such social associations and the degree of participation promote and
enhance collective norms and trust, which are central to the production and maintenance
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of the collective well-being (Putnam 1993, 1995). Table 2 below summarizes the
differences between human capital and social capital as two different forms of capital.

Table 2: Comparison Between Human Capital and Social Capital

Human Capital

Social Capital

Focus

Individual

Relationships

Measures

Duration
Qualifications

Membership/participation
Trust levels

Outcomes

Direct: income; productivity
Indirect: health; civic activity

Social cohesion/solidarity
Membership/participation
Economic achievement
More social capital

Model

Linear

Interactive/circular

Policy

Skilling and accessibility

Citizenship, capacity-building

Adapted from Field, Schuller, and Baron (2000, Table 14.1:250)

Social capital has primarily positive consequences, but negative consequences
also emanate from bad social capital. This is explained in Fukuyama’s work (1999)
where he specifically indicates that social capital is no different from physical or human
capital in generating negative social consequences for individuals or communities. As
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physical capital can be misused for buying ingredients to wipe out the existence of
communities and human capital can be misused for learning new and innovative ways of
mass-murder, social capital can also be misused for spawning racial violence or
nepotistic administration.
It is important to point out that the conceptualization of social capital by different
sociologists and economists have varied over time, but the key elements of generalized
trust and civic engagement run across through all the available literature. None of the
literature however, contains a universally accepted strategy for modeling the various
components of social capital. One reason is that debate continues over what could be
envisaged as the theoretically appropriate components of social capital universally
(Paxton 1999, pp l01). Even given agreement about relevant concepts, valid empirical
indicators are oftentimes unavailable, or the available indicators themselves are
appropriate for one level or unit of analysis but not others. As illustrated by Coleman
himself, the forms and ways in which social capital is used depends on the social
structure one is referring to. The Kahn El Khalil market of Cairo which uses social capital
locally and restrictively is different from the way social capital is used by international
immigrants across nations for furthering their life opportunities (Coleman, 1993).
With the burgeoning of literature on social capital, there have also emerged
certain controversies and issues around the concept. There are two particular
controversies that are useful to understand in respect to the current research. The first
controversy is whether social capital is collective goods or individual investment which
also bring with it the issue of measurement of social capital. In this regard, it would be
useful to distinguish social capital as a relational asset (social relationships) as opposed to
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collective asset (a water dam or a national park). In this sense, social capital can be
measured at individual level but the benefits of it accrue at the social level. An individual
may or may not benefit from his individual trust of others, but collective trust aggregated
at community levels create opportunity structures for collaboration and reciprocity for
communal gains. It is my understanding that taking this stand in social capital is a crucial
factor in justifying the measures of social capital. In other words, social capital can be
measured at the individual level (eg. Individual’s trust or membership in social ties) but
to assess its effectiveness at a collective level, it needs to be aggregated at the community
level.
Both the above controversies have emerged as a result of the intangible and
abstract quality of social capital. Maintaining the relational asset focus of social capital,
Paxton (1999) distinguishes two major components of social capital for measurement as
the individual level: trust and associations. Trust can be defined as: “socially learned and
socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of the organizations and
institutions in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders, that set the
fundamental understandings of their lives” (Barber 1983:165). Simply put, trust is the
expectation that person B will take person A’s interests into account in mutual exchanges.
It is “faith in morality”, Misztal (1996) argues, that trust serves three functions: it
promotes a) social stability, b) social cohesion and c) social collaborations - its motive is
to maintain a group or a community. This trust aspect of social capital reiterates
Durkheim’s assertion that “Men cannot live together without acknowledging, and,
consequently making mutual sacrifices, without tying themselves to one another with
strong, durable bonds” (Durkheim,1964: 228).
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The second major component of social capital is associations, which facilitate
communication, diffusion of information, and social support. Associations can be defined
as the “objective ties” which include “informal” and “formal” relationships or networks
between individuals. While informal relationships are of different types like friendships,
exchange relationships, proximity in space and kinship relationships, formal associations
survive beyond any particular member of the social network. According to the social
capital research, resolution of collective problems and goal attainment in communities
and society at large is accomplished by utilizing resources generated through formal
group membership (see Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956). Table 3 below outlines the
informal and formal aspects of social capital as adapted from MacGillvray and Walker.

Table 3: Components of Informal and Formal Social Capital

Informal Social Capital

Formal Social Capital

Type of Trust

Trust in each other

Trust in organizations

Components

Level of trust
Norms
Reciprocity
Networks & connections

Number of organizations
Services provided
Effectiveness
Community involvement
Networks & partnerships

MacGillivray and Walker (2000, Table 11.1:202)
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In the past decade, economists and sociologists have made significant
contributions in measuring and quantifying some aspects of social capital. The World
Bank has created a forum to address the conceptual and empirical aspects of social capital
(see World Bank, 1999a). The general approach is to identify all the dimensions of social
capital so that it can be more accurately operationalized. The World Bank takes two
approaches. First, it outlines the different types of social capital in terms of structure and
networks. Second, it outlines the normative aspects of social capital. In doing so, the
World Bank encourages the development of two separate but highly inter-correlated
measures. One measure gauges the structural elements of social capital. The other
measures the norms under which actors interact with each other (Narayan, 1999).
Typically, the data to measure social capital are collected through survey
instruments. To measure the social structure of networks, respondents are generally asked
questions about their membership to different groups and the extent to which they
interact among themselves. On the other hand, to gauge the normative aspects of social
capital, respondents are typically asked questions about trust. In both cases, questions are
formulated in the form of metrics so that the multiple dimensions of social capital can be
better captured. Those questions are then used to develop a composite index. The
measure of social capital is used to conduct analyses at the individual as well as the group
level (Ingleharts, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Porter and Christensen, 1999).
As part of the effort to measure the implications of social capital across countries,
there has been an effort to include the role of institutions in examining the relationship of
social capital and economic growth. Through various strands of literature, one can
identify that social capital has significant effects on economic growth and development
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through various mechanisms. Theoretically, social capital contributes to social welfare by
building trust among community members and increasing social activities. This improves
welfare of community members as members start valuing affinity and personal
relationships (Schmidt, 2000). Social capital also acts as a network facilitator. The
capacity of people to work and connect with each other through valuable ties is a useful
determinant for community growth (Bandiera and Rasul, 2002). In a society with high
levels of trust, civic norms and membership, people interact, exchange and participate
more often in joint activities. This facilitates the diffusion of technology and enhances
innovations and learning through human capital accumulation (Fountain, 1997; Coleman
1994; Collier, 1998; Putnam 2000). In developing countries, the presence of social capital
acts as a substitute of formal institutions enabling the masses of poor people to have
access to credit, which according to Knack and Keeper (1997) and Zak and Knack
(1998), leads to better functioning of formal institutions.
One important macro study on the effects of social capital on economic growth is
the work of Temple and Johnson (1998) analyzing economic growth rates in the SubSaharan Africa. Following the work of Adelman and Morris (1968), Johnson (1998)
shows that ethnic diversity and social mobility are good predictors of economic growth
when examined in the context of social capital. Research shows that social capital
explains significant variations in GDP rates between Africa and other regions of the
world (Collier and Gunning 1999). Collier and Gunning argue that the lower GDP rates
observed in African regions can be attributed to the divisions across racial/ethnic lines
because such fractionalization undermines the emergence of social capital. One
interpretation of this result might be that homogeneous societies work better than non29

homogenous societies in generating higher economic growth. In fact, several scientists
have found a positive relationship between the presence of social capital and economic
growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Barro 1997; Collier and Gunning 1999; Fedderke
1997; Fedderke et al. 1999; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Kedzie 1997). Other
studies, however, show that diversity is an important aspect of social capital as it helped
to increase economic efficiency. The important possibility that have emerged from these
contradictory results is that the effects of these indicators on economic growth are truly
non-linear - both high homogeneity and high heterogeneity are undesirable for
systematic, high economic growth.
Other studies also indicate that social capital has important implications at the
micro level. In this respect, social capital works as a channel of communication, and
through a process of mutual understanding, it facilitates coordination and cooperation.
For example, Hyden (1993) examined the implications of social capital at the micro level
in Tanzania. Specifically, he examined how social capital contributed to the actions
driven not only by self-interest but also by collective interests. Social capital is a public
good that in the long run promotes sustainable economic growth (Bebbington 1997).
Stone, Levy, and Paredes (1992) illustrate the complementarity between microand macrolevel social capital and the limits to substitution in their comparison of the
garment industries in Brazil and Chile. Brazil has a complex regulatory system, with laws
that are often inconsistent and very expensive courts. Businesses have learned to rely on
informal alternatives in their day-to-day transactions with customers and suppliers,
especially when credit is involved. Brazilian garment entrepreneurs have worked out an
effective informal credit information system that places a premium on an untarnished
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reputation. In contrast, Chile’s relatively simple legal system and consistent enforcement
of contracts have made the contracting process more secure, so that few contracts are
renegotiated and the default rate on loans has dropped. The comparison suggests that the
extent to which informal associations can replace the rule of law and a formal court
system is limited, underscoring the importance of the role of macrolevel social capital in
making business possible and especially of the government’s role in providing an
enabling environment that is simple, transparent, and consistent. For example, in her
work on collectively managed irrigation systems in Nepal, Ostrom (1990, 1996) has
accounted for differences in rights and responsibilities among users (who gets how much
water and when, who is responsible for which maintenance task of the canal system, and
so forth) in terms of such facts as that some farmers are head-enders while others are tailenders showing that cooperative arrangements display asymmetries among farmers. In
fact a general finding from studies on the management of common property systems is
that entitlements to products of the commons are almost always based on private
holdings. They thus reflect inequalities in private wealth (McKean 1992). Gaspard et al.
(1997) have studied a central drainage channel in the Ethiopian highlands. They found
that those households having more to gain from the collective endeavor (for example, the
ones owning more land, or owning land centrally located in the basin) contributed more
labor to its construction. This is another example of a built-in asymmetry, giving rise to
an asymmetric outcome.
The concept of social capital has also been used to examine the extent to which
social networks have contributed to facilitate leadership in rural communities. O’Brien et
al. (1998) showed that communities with social capital facilitate networks of
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communication among leaders in the communities. This has translated into a more viable
community than those that lack networks of communication. This finding is supported by
other research that examined the interconnectedness of private and public business
activities (Morten 1993). The digital resource aspect of social capital has yielded
interesting results as digital divide coinciding with differences in per capita income.
According to the 1999 International Data Corporation/World Times Information Society
Index (PC magazine June 8, 1999, pp 10), which tracked fifty-five countries that
accounted for 97 per cent of the global gross national product and 99 per cent of
information technology expenditures, the information gap between the rich and poor
countries has continued to widen. This is a line of research that brings together socioeconomic categories, technology expenditures, residential lines, ethnicity and religion to
explain differences in GDP growth among nations.
Social science researches have also used social capital variable jointly with other
independent variables to assess its effects on human capital investment which directly
affects long-term growth. In this line of research, La Porta et al. (1997) demonstrated
empirical tests of the hypothesis that trust affects the performance of many social
institutions and social norms including tax compliance, corruption levels and quality of
the judiciary. In their cross-country regressions of 40 nations, they found that trust has a
significant effect on social institutions. They also concluded that an increase in trust by
one-standard deviation resulted in an increase in the percent of the population with a
high-school degree by one-half a standard deviation. In a paper by Papagapitos and Riley
(2005), the authors argue that there is a positive and significant relationship that runs
from trust to secondary education enrollment in particular. Gradstein and Justman (2000)
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theoretically show the two-way interaction between social capital and human capital. In a
political economy model, they show that social capital increases social cohesion which
strengthens the incentive to accumulate education. Glaieser et al (2000) develop a simple
model in which social capital is treated as ‘capital’ sharing similar characteristics of all
other forms of capital. The results of their study conclude that there is a positive
relationship between the investment in human capital and social capital. This paper
however neglects the social role of social capital and its differences from other forms of
capital.

Economic Growth and Significant Research
It would be relevant to briefly review the concept of economic growth at this
point to make important connections between economic freedom, social capital and
economic growth and postulate the problem statement for this research. After having
introduced the concepts of economic freedom and social capital, I shall first explore the
concept of economic growth and next tie in the concepts of economic freedom and social
capital to economic growth. Economic growth, a key concept in the literature of
economics, has been for the most part understood in numerical-mathematical terms. In
the early part of the modern era in Europe, the economic surplus began to be invested not
only for military purposes but also for other social endeavors such as foreign investment.
This view became equated with the economic theory that a nation's prosperity depended
on the supply of capital and that the total volume of trade was a zero sum game, where
wealth could not be generated except by state regulation of foreign trade over both
domestic trade and pursuit of extractive industries (eg. agriculture). Supporting the
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philosophy of “hoarding”, mercantilism suggests that the government should play an
active, protectionist, role in the economy by encouraging exports and discouraging
imports through corporations, trading companies and the use of tariffs. These ideas
stemmed from a belief in bullionism where precious metals equaled wealth because of its
universal demand. Thus, bullionism, mercantilism and colonization went hand-in-hand
where colonies were created to supply cheaper raw materials which could then be
manufactured and sold.
Economic historian Angus Maddison estimated economic growth since 500 A.D.
However, his research suggests that rapid economic growth, as we observe it today
around several nations, did not take place till 1820. Domestic and foreign investment
marked the beginning of a new concept for promoting economic growth. This was
highlighted in the work of David Hume and Adam Smith. The foundation of the
discipline of modern political economy played a key role as well in re-thinking the
processes of economic growth. The physiocrats argued that productive capacity itself
allowed for growth improvement and increase of physical capital to create an ideal state
of government. While the physiocrats emphasized only the importance of agriculture and
extractive industries as begetting the productive capacity, Adam Smith extended the
notion to include manufacturing as a central aspect to the entire economy.
In the period begetting the development of literature on political economy, the
real measure of economic growth and simultaneous theorization of this process started
with the works of Lewis’s two-sector model and Harrod-Domar models. Economic
growth and the measure of GNP was emphasized as a key component in the early phases
of growth in the economic growth. Arthur Lewis in 1955 in his seminal book, The Theory
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of Economic Growth argued “our subject matter is growth not distribution” and helped to
further the concept and understanding of economic growth.
At the heart of every model of economic growth is the concept of aggregate
production function that can take many forms depending on the relationship between the
factors of production and aggregate output. Models of economic growth have evolved
over time in terms of assembling the concepts of aggregate production function, factors
of production and aggregate output. To begin with, Arthur Lewis’ two-sector model of
economic growth was carved out principally for developing economies. It divides the
economy of a developing country into two sectors: agricultural and industrial - the
traditional agricultural sector is primarily based on self-support which engages the labors
of the greater part of the population, and a modern market-oriented industrial sector is
primarily engaged in industrial production. The agricultural sector has surplus labor such
that the marginal product of labor is zero. The workers are therefore paid according to
average product, or the total output divided by the number of workers. The wage in the
industrial sector encourages low productivity agricultural workers to migrate to urban
areas and join the industrial workforce to generate profits for industry that get reinvested
in the form of new capital. This new capital is therefore tied to the supply of migrant
agricultural workers. The process of reallocation of human resources away from
agriculture and toward industry leads to increased total output, more investment in the
economy and greater economic development. There are many important criticisms of the
two-sector model all stemming from the model’s cardinal assumption that there is always
a surplus of labor in agriculture suggesting that if a surplus of labor does not exist, there
can be no growth in a developing economy.
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The Harrod-Domar model of economic growth suggests that the economy’s rate
of growth depends on the level of saving and productivity of investment (i.e. the capital
output ratio), which is the most important parameter for the model. For example, if $30
worth of capital equipment produces each $1 of annual output, a capital-output ratio of 30
to 1 exists. A 10 to 1 capital-output ratio indicates that only $10 of capital is required to
produce each $1 of output annually.
The model argues that economic growth depends on the amount of labor and
capital. The implication of this model for developing economies which often have an
abundant supply of labor is that they lack physical capital that holds back economic
growth and development. Net investment leads to more capital accumulation generating
higher output and income which in turn allow higher levels of savings, capital
accumulation, higher output etc. The Harrod-Domar model of growth was an important
twist to the classical assumptions of two-sector economy. However, at the very basics,
the model postulated a lockstep relationship between growth in investment and national
income where the key parameter of growth is a capital-output ratio, otherwise essentially
a measure of the efficiency of investments. This view that capital formation is the single
most important determinant of growth was at the heart of the developmentalist strategy of
the capital fundamentalists that had become very popular in the early 1940’s to early
1960’s to re-stabilize aid-financed investment for developing economies.
GDP per capita is used as an indicator of the average standard of living in any
given country. Economic growth has therefore been often seen as indicative of an
increase in the average standard of living. Also, in the absence of any other best measure
of economic growth, GDP per capita as a measure of economic growth has been accepted
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as the most standardized measure internationally. GDP per capita, however, is not a
perfect measure of well-being. Despite its limitations, it remains the most common
measure for gauging improvement of quality of life.
The new momentum in the growth literature arose from the neo-classical
contribution of Robert Solow, the Nobelist of 1987, whose economic theory on growth
was a step beyond the Harrod-Domar model. The main difference is that Solow proposed
adjustment in wages to keep people fully employed. Specifically, he proposed a growth
model where the capital-output ratio, “v”, was precisely the adjusting variable that would
lead a system back to its steady-state growth path, i.e. that “v” would move to bring s/v
into equality with the natural rate of growth (n). What was Solow’s contribution was the
concept of diminishing returns still keeping a major focus on capital formation. Solow
argued that there is an optimal combination of labor and capital, after which each unit of
additional capital brings diminishing returns - hence, physical capital alone cannot
produce growth. In the Solow model, “growth” is the way we can have a higher standard
of living, on average “if each of us produces more goods on average. So what we are
interested in is production per worker called labor productivity” (Easterly, 2002: 48).
Robert Solow’s main emphasis for economic growth is “technological change”.
According to Solow, if growth is summarily expressed as the unit increase in production
per worker, called labor productivity, the only way to increase growth is by constantly
introducing labor-saving technology to increase labor output on an ongoing basis for each
unit of time saved. Capital saving and capital investment does not sustain long-run rate of
growth because saving and investment may divert money from consumption to buying
machinery, but machinery in itself does not raise the long-run growth mechanisms. What
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then increases growth or labor productivity is the growth of production per worker
through technical changes. Labor saving technology, the prime ingredient for growth is
another term for “output-per-worker-increasing technology”.
Solow indicated that technological innovation is a key component for promoting
economic growth. Other than raising a degree of doubt to some of the tacit implications
of the Solow model that population growth rate “dictates” the steady-state growth rates of
all the variables in the economy, technical progress is divorced from capital
accumulation, higher savings do not increase the long-run growth rate and there is no
learning, some scholars like Mankiw (1992), Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Scott (1989),
and Easterly (2002) among others have criticized the Solow model for explaining growth
in terms of exogenous factors of technological change. For the purpose of this
dissertation, I will use the Solow model of economic growth since it is still a widely
accepted model used by social scientists as a reference point notwithstanding the
criticisms it had faced in the recent years. It will be a challenge to extend the model using
some endogenous factors that the critics have alluded to without of course replacing the
model.

Integrating Social Capital and Economic Freedom: A Theoretical Exploration
Over the last two decades, there has been a surge of literature on both the
concepts of “social capital” and “economic freedom” in the field of social sciences.
However, the tying in of the two concepts has still been neglected or remained
underdeveloped to date. One major reason which has complicated the problem of tying
together these concepts is the way “social capital” and “economic freedom” is defined
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and measured in popular parlance, but most importantly, these two concepts are still
being researched and developed through different studies and from various angles. There
is comprehensive theoretical literature around both the concepts, but what has remained
challenging is the understanding of two concepts as they condition each other and
mutually determine growth prospects of an economy. In this section of the literature
review, I draw on major research around these two concepts to capture common
categories under which these can be placed and thus understood as interlinked concepts
in the social sciences.

Trust components: From the broad discussion of the two concepts of “economic
freedom” and “social capital”, it is understood that social capital necessarily embraces the
components of trust and collective action in civil society based on the density of member
networks. Economic freedom (EF), on the other hand embraces government protection of
monetary assets, government operations and regulations as in price controls, standardized
lending and borrowing rates, government commitment to non-discriminatory taxations
and government commitments to laws on international exchange. Here it is important to
scrutinize the concept of economic freedom to understand that as we are talking about
EF, we are also talking about the “efficiency” of government institutions. These efficient
institutions no longer remain efficient if they are also not trust-enhancing institutions.
At a more general level, Kaushik Basu (1998) has stated that for individual
rationality to lead to efficiency, there needs to be a meeting ground for agents to respect
each other’s entitlements. The obvious fact that emerges here is that, if efficient
institutions were left to themselves without the internal codes of conduct which the public
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understands as a “rule of law” and if individual rationality was deemed to be the most
efficient route to civil society, then both the efficiency of government institutions and
civic trust in the functions of an able government would come to an immediate end. The
basic thrust again is the way in which government institution credibility is established
among citizens who are trusting of themselves and of the government and yet are
endowed with all the possibilities to democratically fight against all infringement of their
civil rights. It is not being argued that distrust in the impartiality and fairness in the
government takes place only in nations with lower economic freedom. Such distrusts can
take place also in countries with higher economic freedom. Trust in government and its
institutions are strongly associated in that social trust can help develop effective social
and political institutions which in turn create a sense of confidence in the public on the
role of institutions in their daily lives (Newton, 2001; 2003).

Participation and agency: One of the other important concepts that tie together
social capital and economic freedom is the concept of participation and agency in the
effective functioning of institutions. Just as the concept of social capital envisages the
measures of trust and civic engagement in society, so the notion of economic freedom of
nations cannot be devoid of the ways in which rational agents can participate in nondiscriminatory processes of exchange and market transactions. Part of economic freedom
for individuals involves safe property rights. It is not simply a `rule of law' that binds the
government with citizens, but also inherent in the system is peoples' agency to participate
in the events of infringement of such laws. The former socialist regime in Russia with its
central planning and state-controlled economy neither allowed for free participation of
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agencies to question government policies or devised changes through electoral voting
which would ensure economic freedom of its citizen body. In an economically free
society, undue seizure of the private property (or any such right) can be questioned and
accounted for and the government is liable to be taken to court-of-law for any breach of
economic freedom rights of its people.
The issue of participation and agency brings one to the broader question of
democracy as it relates to social capital and economic freedom. A true democracy
functions by way of open dialogues, transparency, accountability and “participatory
processes” in public and corporate settings. As North (1993) puts it, “well specified and
enforced property rights, a necessary condition for economic growth, are only secure
when political and civil rights are secure, otherwise arbitrary confiscation is always a
threat”. Democracy in societies with high economic freedom can limit rent-seeking by its
ways of checks and balances. Recently Rodrik (2000) has argued that democratic
institutions are the ultimate means of conflict management in societies as they take into
account diverse group interests and aim to resolve them in a predictable, inclusive and
participatory manner. The key observation made in these arguments is that democratic
rights of people are inseparable from the economic freedom conditions of its institutions
as democracy serves to both protect citizen rights, but most importantly, to let the use of
agency and participation guide the shaping of public decision-making processes.
Social capital is also instrumentally linked to the agency and participation of
actors. If there are no ways in which people in a certain society can collaborate, discuss,
inform, influence, preside or create obligations for each other, there is no formation of
social capital to that extent. As Coleman points out, “in political setting such as a
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legislature, a legislator in a position with extra resources (such as Speaker of the House of
Representatives or the Majority Leader of the Senate in the U.S. Congress) can, by
effective use of resources, build up a set of obligations from other legislators that makes
it possible to get legislation passed that would otherwise be stymied. This concentration
of obligations constitutes social capital that is useful not only for this powerful legislator
but useful also in getting an increased level of action on the part of a legislature” (1988, p
S103).
Similarly, informal social structures like the rotating-credit association
characteristic of South-east Asia e.g. Malaysia and Bangladesh would not be able to
function without a high degree of social organization which constitutes its social capital.
The very formation of these informal social networks is a function of the participatory
rights to align in the name of common interests. In this regard, Joe Stiglitz comments,
“Participation itself can help create a sense of community, a sine qua non for a high level
of social capital.” (2002, pp. 174). The social relationship aspect of social capital does not
automatically inhere in social structure, it comes to exist only in the presence of goal
formations of individuals, mutual obligations, reinforced norms and sanctions, all of
which depends of agency and length of participatory scope of such individuals. While the
degree of benefits of social capital may vary from one group to another, negative social
capital is exclusivist, monopolist, non-democratic or anti rule-of-law that may generate
some localized benefits for a group but does not build on accretion, accumulation of
inclusions of larger social networks. Needless to point out, the relationship between
economic freedom and social capital discussed in this paper does not concern negative
social capital networks of non-participatory, transitional governments which are yet to
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establish their own institutional credibility per se, or anti-social or monopolist groups
within a democratic regime with extremely limited scope.

Values and norms of democracy: The questions of values and norms have been of
considerable concern for sociologists starting with the classical tradition of the founding
fathers. In the realm of economics, this has also been pronounced in the works beginning
with Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Karl Marx, Frederick Hayek, Karl
Polanyi to the present day economist Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz. As Hayek aptly
observed, “Economic considerations are merely those by which we reconcile and adjust
our different purposes, none of which, in the last resort, are economic (except those of the
miser or the man for whom making money has become an end in itself)” (1960: 35). In
addition to these, there have been persistent concerns in the field of social economics and
socioeconomics regarding the various roles played by values, morals and norms in
constant reproduction of the societal fabric. It is in this context that the personalist, moral
or humanistic economics of today has focused densely on the ethics of economic rights
and processes in daily living. Drawing from the sustained concerns about values, it can be
quite rightly argued that both social capital and economic freedom are tied together by a
nexus of values and ethics that are characteristic of both democracy and development.
When people build networks, they do not do so arbitrarily, but on the bases of
institutionalized behavioral patterns. “Instrumental customs and norms shape behavior
and provide a needed social order” (Michael Carroll and J.R. Stanfield, 2003: 402). These
customs and norms create expectations and obligations that group members adhere to
with responsibility and confidence.
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In the creation of social capital, common norms and mutually agreed preferences
mediate and control individual’s behaviors within the network. Just as trust does not
automatically inhere in social relationships, so the norms and values within network
relationships is continuously built through communication, open dialogues, exchange of
knowledge and information channels, mutual feelings and collaborative practices that
reconfirms the membership of individuals with a shared sense of purpose. As the OECD
(2001: 41) outlines, social capital is built on “networks together with shared norms,
values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups.”
When we talk about economic freedom, we inter alias talk about the overall value
systems of which is it a part. If a nation is manned by a command economy and
militarism, it’s economic freedom conditions, correspondingly will be much lower than a
nation with a liberalized government. In this related context, Amartya Sen (1994: 6) has
showed us the fact that democratic societies do not simply allow famines to occur. He
merits a large array of facts to argue that “Botswana, for example, experienced a fall in
food production of 17 percent, and Zimbabwe a fall of 38 percent, between 1979-81 and
1983-84, in the same period in which the food production amounted to a relatively
modest 11 percent decline or 12 percent decline in Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudan and
Ethiopia, with comparatively smaller declines in food output, had major famines.
Botswana and Zimbabwe had none. This splendid outcome was owed largely to timely
and extensive famine prevention policies by these latter countries.” What emerges from
this fact is that the permissive advantages of economic freedom can only be generated by
the values and social capitals of a democratic government. Major economic deprivations
of a country is a failure of governmental policies in equality of outcomes, for even during
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famines, Sen points out, there is a small number of groups who have full access to food
resources even as the majority population goes through extreme hunger crises.

Values and norms of development: The values and norms that go into the creation
of social capital and economic freedom are broadly congruent with the values of
comprehensive development of societies. In his Prebisch Lecture (1998: 3), Joe
Stiglitz defined development as:
Development represents a transformation of society, a movement from traditional
relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and
education, traditional methods of production, to more ``modern'' ways. For
instance, a characteristic of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as
it is.
Considering this definition of development, one can notice the close connection
between social capital and development. The changes ushered by modernity must be
supported by group cohesion, consensus-building through transparency and open
negotiations. Weak social capital cannot support consensus or a sense of community
welfare - if there is no solidarity between individuals in a community, the needs of the
community as a whole remain weak by forces of partisan interests. Linking social capital
to the capacity of a community enhances resources, ideas, and information from formal
institutions beyond the immediate community radius (Woolcock, 2001). Community
interests and membership act as strong countervailing forces to powerful bureaucratic
government measures while providing checks on unilateral policies framed by any
government.
Community interests and membership act as strong countervailing forces to
powerful bureaucratic government measures while providing checks on unilateral
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policies framed by any government. This process also helps to achieve shared benefits to
develop the collective effort and bargaining power of people to control their own
activities and to attain self-reliance (Broadhead, 1987). On many occasions, government
sectors have aligned with non-for-profit NGOs in implementing successful development
programs for welfare of neglected communities. There are numerous examples to suggest
that schools in which parents have a voice are often more successful as this engenders
parental involvement in children's work and water projects which have taken into account
community consensus have been more successful simply because of the commitment and
efforts drawn from common interests which helps support a long-term maintenance of
development activities. What comes to exist in effect is a responsibility for collective
consciousness-raising, information gathering, analysis and most of the steps related to
development process through capacity building of a community.
Economic freedom, in much the same way is related to development. Sen’s
observation about a holistic and integrated model of development suggests that a “way of
seeing development is in terms of the expansion of the real freedoms that the citizens
enjoy to pursue the objectives they have reason to value, and in this sense the expansion
of human capability can be, broadly, seen as the central feature of the process of
development” (Sen and Dreze, 1999). In the eyes of Sen, development is one and the
same with “capability freedom” and economic freedom is just one aspect of capability
freedom. The freedom to earn, spend or retain one’s earnings, the freedom to property
and assets, the freedom for non-discretionary taxation, the freedom for free trade are all
components of capability freedom without which development cannot be complete. As
Stiglitz points out (2002), it is often possible that only a few enclaves within an economy
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has raised productivity, but this does not ensure “a true development is a transformation
of the society as a whole” - for this cycle, to be complete, the fulfillment of basic
capability freedom for the entire society is an absolute must. A large part is played by
social capital in this development transformation. Social capital constitutes the educative
and empowering process in attainment of freedom. Participation is critical to
development if development, is to belong to the people (Dusseldorp, 1981). The basic
concept of participation is community-based, people-centered development which
regards the human factor as the most important ingredient in promoting collective effort
and strengthening organizational processes for furthering the goals of freedom.
Investigating the relationship between social capital and economic freedom helps
us create a platform for understanding the constituent components and outcomes of their
potentials. Both social capital and economic freedom are built on the foundation of trust:
trust between collective entities at the micro-level and macro-level and the continued
renewal of this trust is what furthers the goals of development associated with them.
Trust cannot originate out of force in modern society and here arises the role of
moral/ethical economics to explain the process of feedback between and among units in
the mutual enhancement of trusts. Both social capital and economic freedom embrace
agency and participation of individuals for it is only through active engagement, open
dialogues, transparent negotiations through which people come to share responsibility
and reciprocity in modern society. Peoples’ voice and agency, mutual concerns of civic
engagement create resources to produce definitive and desired outcomes renewing trust
in their capacity building as agents and providing checks on abuses of bureaucratic
power, if any, in the reconstitution of their collective existence. The values and norms
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associated with “bridging” and “bonding” collective entities oftentimes create negative
social capital, but ethical dimensions of social science points out that these have narrow,
partisan interests which are both short-term and immediate, and have negative,
exclusionary outcomes that are disruptive and non-sustainable for overall progress of
communities. The fundamental values associated with positive social capital and
economic freedom are those of democracy and development. As Giddens argues,
“Constitutional authority can be understood as an implicit contract which has the same
form as conditions of association explicitly negotiated between equals.....Democracy
means discussion, the chance for the ‘force of the better argument’ to count as against
other means of determining decisions (of which the most important are policy decisions).
A democratic order provides institutional arrangements for mediation, negotiation and the
reaching of compromises where necessary.” (Giddens, 1994, pp 186). Even the idea of
“needs” including the understanding of “economic needs” requires public discussion and
exchange of information, views, and analyses. Finally, social capital and economic
freedom embrace the values of development of communities and nations as they relate to
the increase of ultimate capability freedom of all individuals.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The second chapter detailed the literature around two main areas: a) the effects of
economic freedom on growth, b) the effects of social capital on growth. The third chapter
will discuss the methodology of this study and will consist of four key areas: 1) an
explanation of the purpose of this study, 2) a discussion of the neoclassical Solow model
of economic growth, 3) the research hypotheses flowing from this version of a revised
Solow model, 4) a description and explanation of the data.
The purpose of the study is four-fold: a) to understand the relationship between
economic freedom and social capital, b) to understand the relationship between economic
freedom and economic growth, c) to understand the relationship between social capital
and economic growth and, d) to compare these relationships between developed and
developing nations. To understand and explore the relationships mentioned above, this
study will first discuss the neoclassical Solow model including its implications and
criticisms. In the next step, a revised neoclassical Solow model will be developed. In
addition to the original Solow model variables, the revised Solow model will include the
social capital and economic freedom as explanatory variables. A series of eleven related
hypotheses will be developed in relation to the effect of the two new determinants on
economic growth and the association of the components of social capital and economic
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freedom. The last section will discuss the variables considered for this study and the data
sources. Figure 1 below summarizes the research design for exploring the relationship of
economic freedom and social capital to economic growth in developed and developing
countries.
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Purpose:
•
•
•
•

Conceptual Context:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

To explore the relationship
between EF and SC
To explore the relationship
between EF and EG
To explore the relationship
between SC and EG
To compare the above between
developed and developing
countries

Economic freedom
Social capital
Neoclassical Solow model
Economic theories
Sociological theories
Social capital theory
Developed countries
Developing countries

Research Hypotheses:
1. Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is positively associated with increased scores in the area of
legal structure and security of property rights within economic freedom.
2. Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is associated with increased scores in the area of access to
sound money within economic freedom .
3. Increase in mean trust is associated with increased scores in the area of freedom to trade internationally within
economic freedom.
4. Increase in mean trust is associated with increase in mean belongingness/membership in social groups
5. Increase in mean trust is associated with decrease in mean belongingness/membership in social groups.
6. Increase in mean belongingness/membership has positive association with the size of the government, for
correlation for mean trust legal structure and security of property rights, access and mean belongingness to sound
money, regulation of credit, labor and business and mean economic freedom.
7. Physical capital is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both developed and developing
nations.
8. Human capital is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both developed and developing nations.
9. Economic Freedom is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both developed and developing
nations.
10. Trust is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both developed and developing nations.
11. Belongingness is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both developed and developing nations.

Methods:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Validity:
•

Review of quantitative data
Explanation and derivation of
equations from Solow model
Hypotheses formulation
Merging data on economic
freedom, social capital and
growth
Generating and testing models
Regression Analyses

•
•
•

Triangulation of sources,
methods and theories
Multi-source data for crosschecks
Search for countries that are
outliers
Comparison between
developing and developed
countries

Figure 1: Research Design for Exploring the Relationship between Economic Freedom
and Social Capital on Growth in Developed and Developing Countries
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The Solow (Neoclassical) Growth Model in Perspective:
One of the groundbreaking works in the area of economic growth that
substantively enriched the growth literature and which is still the most useful theory for
understanding all other complex models of growth is the neoclassical Solow model. In
Robert Solow’s (1956) article titled “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic
Growth”, he explained the rationale for his neoclassical growth model: “A remarkable
characteristic of the Harrod-Domar model is that it consistently studies long-run
problems with the usual short-run tools. Instead one thinks of the long-run as the domain
of the neoclassical analysis, the land of the margin” (Solow, 1956, p. 66). Solow’s
neoclassical growth model was the first model in the growth theory to explain long-term
growth in terms of labor-augmenting technology. The Solow growth model starts with a
neoclassical production function:
Y = F(K/L)

(1)

where Y is economic output, K is capital and L is labor. Output is simply a function of
the capital stock and the labor supply. Solow assumed that this production function
exhibits constant returns to scale, which means that if all inputs are increased by a certain
multiple, output will increase by exactly the same multiple. Scaling up all inputs scales
up output proportionately, that is:
cY = F(cK, cL)

(2)

where c is a constant. If c is arbitrarily chosen to be 1/L, equation (2) can be rewritten as:
Y = F(K,1)

(3)

or simply y = f(k)

(4)
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where y is output per worker and k is capital per worker. Output per worker is, therefore
simply a function of capital per worker.
The production function in equation (4) is assumed to exhibit diminishing returns
to both capital and labor. This assumption implies that as equal increments of one factor
of production are added to a fixed amount of the other factors, output increases, but it
increases by ever smaller amounts. In the Solow growth model, the slope of the
production function, as shown by curve labeled y = f(k) in Figure 2 reflects the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital. Solow implies that continuous
investment in physical capital cannot, by itself, generate permanent, long-term growth
because diminishing returns would eventually cause the gains in output per worker to
approach zero. Solow’s model thus clashed with development economists who, at the
time, believed that increasing saving and investment was the route to perpetual economic
growth.
The incorporation of diminishing returns into Solow’s growth model implies that
capital accumulation cannot lead to long-term economic growth but can, however, lead to
short-run or transitory growth as an economy moves from one single point on an
aggregate production function to another (e.g. in Figure. 2 from y0 to y1). To determine
the long-run or steady-state per capita output level in the Solow model, the dynamics of
capital and labor stocks must be included in the model. Labor is assumed to follow a
simple exogenous path, given as:
ΔL = nL(t)

(5)

where n is the rate of population growth and t is time. Capital is assumed to follow a
slightly more complex pattern given as:
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ΔK = sY(t) - δK(t)

(6)

where s is the saving rate and δ is the depreciation rate. The right-hand side of the
equation 6 is made up of two components, capital accumulation (sY) and capital
depreciation (δK). The capital stock is assumed to grow at the rate of saving s. The
second part states that the capital stock is assumed to diminish at the rate of depreciation,
δ which itself is assumed to be related to the size of the existing capital stock. Dividing
equation (6) by equation (5) gives an equation detailing the evolution of the capital stock
per worker:
Δk = sf (k) – (δ + n) k

(7)

where
Δ = ‘change in’,
δ = rate of depreciation,
s = saving rate,
k = capital-labor ratio and
n = constant rate of labor force growth.
Equation (7) shows that any change in capital per worker is affected by three
things: 1) it is positively related to the saving rate ‘s’, 2) it is negatively related to the
population growth rate ‘n’, 3) it is negatively related to the depreciation rate ‘δ’. In the
Solow model, long-run steady state output per worker can be determined by analyzing the
evolution of capital per worker ‘k’. Capital per worker, and thus output per worker
increases with savings (shown as the line ‘sy’ in Figure 2). Conversely, capital per
worker declines with population growth and depreciation (shown as the line (n+δ)k in
Figure 2).
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Capital deepening occurs when savings increases the amount of capital per
worker. Capital widening, on the other hand occurs when increases in the size of the
labor force and depreciation reduces capital per worker. The steady state capital stock per
worker, k0 in Figure 2 occurs where the s line intersects the (δ + n) k line. It is associated
with the steady state output per worker y0 in Figure. 2. In the long-run, output per worker
cannot exceed y0 because at that point capital widening exceeds capital deepening –
depreciation and population growth exceeds the additional capital generated through
saving – and capital per worker declines, leading to reductions in output per worker. On
the other hand, if capital deepening exceeds capital widening, the capital per worker
increases which in turn increases output per worker. Steady state capital stock occurs
where sy = (n + d)k, that is where capital deepening is exactly offset by capital widening.
Thus economic forces act to push the economy toward k0 and y0 in the long run. This is
symbolized by the arrows in Figure 2.
The other factor contributing to economic growth in the Solow model not yet
addressed is technological progress. In economics, technology is defined as the
knowledge used to combine inputs to make output. Essentially, having better technology
means being able to produce more output from a given quantity of inputs. The Solow
model assumes that technological progress improves labor efficiency, that is, it is “laboraugmenting”. In order to analyze the effect of including labor-augmenting technological
progress in the Solow model, the production function is re-specified as:
Y = F(K, AL)

(8)

where A is technology and AL is known as the number of “effective” units of labor.
Technology makes workers more effective so each worker counts as ‘A’ workers in
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production meaning there are AL “effective” workers or laborers in the economy. The
growth rate of technology is assumed to be exogenous and specified as:
ΔA = gA

(9)

Technical know-how increases at 2 or 3 percent per year, for example ‘g’. The model
does not explicitly determine what causes technology to grow, instead it is assumed that
the growth rate of technology is equal to a constant rate, g. Now, combining equations
(9), (5) and (6), equation (7) can be re-written to depict the capital per “effective” worker
dynamics. This equation is given as:
Δk = ׳sy( – ׳δ + g + n) k׳

(10)

where k ׳is capital per effective worker and y ׳is output per effective worker. This
equation states that net investment per “effective” worker is the difference between
capital deepening (sy )׳and capital widening, now given as (n + g + δ)k׳, with the
inclusion of technical change.
The following points give the intuition underlying this equation. Savings per
effective worker, (sY) equals investment per effective worker. Some of the new capital
per effective worker must be used to replenish depreciated capital per worker (δk)׳. In
addition for every worker, there are (n + g) new effective workers (labor growing at n and
technology growing at g) entering the economy, each of whom requires k ׳units of capital
(n+g) k )׳to keep capital per effective worker unchanged. The basic intuition is that
unless you replace worn out capital, provide each new worker with the same amount of
capital, and invest in capital to keep up with technology then capital per effective worker
in the economy will fall. So the level of break-even investment per effective worker (the
amount of investment per effective worker necessary to leave capital per effective worker
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Figure 2: Diagram of the Basic Solow Model
It is important to note that in steady state what is constant is not output per worker
but rather output per effective worker. So in the steady-state output per effective worker
is constant but output per worker is actually increasing at the rate of technical progress.
Thus with the introduction of technological progress, it is possible for an economy to
experience sustained growth in per capita output and hence income, at rate of the
technological progress, g. The Solow model suggests two main reasons for the
differences in economic growth rates across countries. The first situation is where two
countries with the same long-run steady-state level of income may have different growth
paths if they are in different points in the transition to the steady state. For instance, one
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country may be or near the steady-state capital stock, k0 while another may be still in the
process of transitioning to the steady-state and located at a point further away from the
steady-state. The associated growth rates of these two countries would be different
because of their different growth paths. The second situation is where two countries may
have different growth rates if one has a higher steady state level of income than the other.
For instance, if two countries have different savings rates, rates of technical progress,
labor force growth rates or depreciation rates, the steady-state level of each country will
be different. In this case, if they are approaching different steady-states, their
corresponding growth rates will be different.
Some economists have claimed that the Solow model predicts convergence of per
capita income in the world. Such an implication of the Solow model is based on faulty
reasoning. The Solow model actually implies “conditional convergence” of steady state
level of per capita output Y (and not absolute convergence) only if countries have the
same saving rates, the same production functions, the same rates of technological
progress, the same depreciation rates and the same population growth rates.
One of the criticisms of the Solow model or traditional neoclassical model is that
it assumes the saving rate, the rate of growth of labor supply, the skills of the workforce
and the pace of technological change as exogenously determined (i.e. they are all
determined outside the economic model of growth). In response, a series of endogenous
growth or the new growth models emerged which endogenized some of the variables of
growth causing technological progress. The New Growth Theory provides a theoretical
framework for analyzing persistent growth of output that is determined within the system
governing the production process. For instance, technological progress is assumed to be
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determined within the economic system in many of these models and is not just a given
factor outside the model. Another key assumption of these models is increasing returns to
scale. The models also address technological spillovers and other positive externalities
that may be present in the process of industrialization.
Additionally, statistical studies of economic growth have gone beyond the Solow
model to seek many more factors of economic growth. Staying within the framework of
the Solow neoclassical production function, the model can be improved by incorporating
a number of additional determining variables of economic growth. Recent studies by
Levine and Renelt (1992) and by Sala-I-Martin (1997) have shown that there is a high
degree of “robustness” in statistical models using a number of institutional variables as
determinants of economic growth such as a democracy index, the rule of law,
international trade and others.
Denison (1985),

Fuess and Van den Verg (1997) showed that there is a

significant proportion of growth regression that is not explained by growth in factors of
production. This is termed the “Solow residual” or “total factor productivity” (TFP). De
Soto (1989) estimates that as much as half of all the economic output occurs in the
largely informal sectors of the Peruvian economy accounting for variations in output
growth. Similarly for Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-1970’s, the TFP has been negative
as a result of corruption, civil wars, high levels of crime and extensive trade barriers.
Clearly factors other than savings, population growth, depreciation and technological
change are responsible for differences in income and growth across countries. In this
study, I extend the existing growth literature to include social capital and economic
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freedom variables, which have not been accounted for jointly in the previous growth
models.
The empirical portion of this research will be patterned after Mankiw, Romer and
Weil’s (1992) estimation of an alternative version of the Solow growth model which they
call the “augmented Solow model”. This model adds a human capital term to the Solow
model. Human capital is the knowledge acquired by workers as a result of specific
investments made in education, training and self-learning. Human capital involves
“investment” just as does the creation of physical capital. Also, like physical capital,
human capital depreciates because people often forgets things and lose certain skills if
they do not continually use their newly acquired skills. New investment in human capital
is needed just to replace the human capital that disappears over time with the loss of older
generations. Human capital in the model was measured using data on enrollment levels
for secondary education in each country around the globe. The Solow model predictions
were statistically proved but the augmented version of the model, which included the
human capital variable, accounted for better regression results on growth with the
inclusion of the human capital variable. In this research, I include not only human capital
variable, but also social capital measures and measures of economic freedom as
determinants of observed economic growth rates.
The design of this study is to extend the Solow Model to include some important
sociological and economic variables. Revisiting the original Solow model, we find that
capital in the model is meant to be capital investment stock, which increases with the
increasing rate of savings. Thus countries with high saving rate experience faster growth
of output. Low saving rates lead to slower output growth (e.g. Kenya shows about 15%
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saving rate and GDP growth of about only 1% in 1960-1996). Following the augmented
Solow growth model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil, what became significantly important
is the inclusion of the human capital variable. The New Growth theory has shown human
capital variable to be a key ingredient for differences in growth and social capital
theorists have proved the important point that social capital contributes/impedes growth
as a result of levels of trust/mistrust and levels of interconnectivity/detachment among
members in a community sharing similar social norms (Coleman; 1988, Putnam; 2000,
Field, Schuller, and Baron; 2000). In fact, Jordan Boslego (2005), the senior editor of
Harvard International Review calls the combination of trust, a key component of social
capital, with lack of corruption a form of ‘clean capital’. Other studies of growth
literature have suggested the importance of social capital determinants of growth
manifested in trust, membership in organizations etc. Thus, in the present study, the
concept of capital in the model is defined to mean 1) physical capital, 2) human capital
and 3) social capital.
The other variable added to the growth model in the present study is the economic
freedom. The key ingredients of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary
exchange, freedom to compete and protection of person and property. Each of the key
ingredients of economic freedom influence economic growth of a country. Economic
freedom increases prosperity of nations, other kinds of freedoms, quality of life
improvements and decreases poverty and probability of war which in turn directly effect
the economic growth of countries (Gwartney and Lawson; 2004). Study of the empirical
relationship between economic freedom and investment and growth shows that both
investment per worker as a share of GDP and GDP itself rise as a result of improvement
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in freedom ratings of countries. According to the Economic Freedom of the World: 2004
Annual Report, between 1980-2000, countries with less than 5 overall rating in economic
freedom had $845 investment value per worker, while countries between the overall
ratings of 5 and 7 in economic freedom had $3319 investment value per worker.

EG
EFW

I/GDP

Figure 3: Effects of Economic Freedom on I/GDP and Economic Growth
Thus, in the reconstituted model of growth in the present study,

Y = F(Kp, Kh, Ks, L, E)
Y = Economic Growth (GDP at PPP)
Kp = Physical Capital
Kh = Human Capital
Ks = Social Capital
L = Labor Force
E = Economic Freedom
Figure 3. shows that there is a relationship between economic freedom, economic
growth and investment rates of a country. Economic freedom influences the investment
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rates of a country which is turn slows or hastens the economic growth – thus economic
freedom both directly and indirectly influences the economic growth rates of a country.

Independent Variables
Physical
Capital

Dependent Variable

Human
Capital

Economic
Growth
Social
Capital

Economic
Freedom

Figure 4: The augmented Solow model with social capital and economic freedom
determinants
Figure. 4 illustrates the diagram of the augmented Solow model that has been
revised to include the social capital and economic freedom variables for the purpose of
this study. The research questions outlined in Figure 1 are linked to Figure 4 to explore
the relationships between the independent and the dependent variables as they appear in
Figure 4. In Figure. 4, physical capital, human capital, social capital, labor and economic
freedom have effects on economic growth, social capital increases economic growth by
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increasing physical and human capital, economic freedom increases economic growth by
increasing physical capital and social capital and economic freedom are correlated.
Eleven different hypotheses have been formulated in reference to both the research
question for this study as well as the diagrammatic model in Figure 4.

Hypotheses in this Research

Hypothesis 1: Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is positively associated
with increased scores in the area of legal structure and security of property rights within
economic freedom.

Hypothesis 2: Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is associated with
increased scores in the area of access to sound money within economic freedom.

Hypothesis 3: Increase in mean trust is associated with increased scores in the area of
freedom to trade internationally within economic freedom.
The intuition for the hypotheses discussed above rest on the fact that higher trust
leads to increased protection of persons and their property rights. If individuals and
businesses lack trust that contracts will be enforced and that the fruits of their
productivity will be protected, then their incentive to engage in productive activity will be
reduced. It is commonly known in public-choice economic theory that access to sound
money for productive investment is related to trust among people because rent-seeking,
bribery or money-laundering activities of private investors and government bodies limit
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the access to sound money. From this logic, it is also assumed that in countries with
traditions of bribery and corruption, the trust among people is limited which makes them
go through extensive bureaucratic paperwork to obtain credits and money for investment.
In the absence of trust, there is capital flight and high inflation, which limits or curtails
citizens’ ability to own foreign currency for fear of high risk factors.

Hypothesis 4: Increase in mean trust is associated with increase in mean
belongingness/membership in social groups.

Hypothesis 5: Increase in mean trust is associated with decrease in mean
belongingness/membership in social groups.
Hypothesis 4 and 5 are competing hypotheses. Hypothesis 4 rests on the
assumption that as trust among people goes up, belongingness and participation in social
activities goes up as a result of the social bond and the element of certainty trust creates.
Hypothesis 5 rests on the opposite assumption that as trust among people goes up,
decision of social processes are taken for granted and belongingness and participation in
social activities no longer matter because different social groups are trusted anyway.

Hypothesis 6: Increase in mean belongingness/membership has positive association with
the size of the government, legal structure and security of property rights, access and
mean belongingness to sound money, regulation of credit, labor and business, and mean
economic freedom.
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The argument for this hypothesis is that social capital measured in terms of membership
in different kinds of organizations activates cooperation and collaboration among people
and government to participate in various productive efforts contributing to increased
output. Conversely, it is assumed that strong social ties reduce incidence of cheating and
illegal incentives among people. Savings and productive investments go up which in turn
relate to each individual component of economic freedom.

Hypothesis 7: Physical capital is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for
both developed and developing nations.
The above hypothesis is derived from the Solow neoclassical model where an increase in
physical capital stock increases economic growth through the mechanisms of savings and
investment.

Hypothesis 8: Human capital is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for
both developed and developing nations.
The logic for this hypothesis is based on the augmented Solow model and the
New Growth Theory conclusions where an increase in human capital (measured as
enrollment in secondary education) increases economic growth by generating a skilled
and trained productive labor force that increase both the quantity and quality of total
output.

Hypothesis 9: Economic freedom is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for
both developed and developing nations.
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Economic freedom as a composite measure of five major policy areas including
government expenses, enforcement of legal structure, access to sound money, freedom of
international trade and regulation of market activities determine the prospects for growth.
The economic freedom conditions of each country can promote or deter growth by
increasing or reducing conditions that create output growth.

Hypothesis 10: Trust is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both
developed and developing nations.
The proposition here is that if there is trust present among people, it indirectly
means that there is little or no corruption present. An increase in corruption makes
government and people lose trust. Corruption in the form of misuse of opportunities,
capital etc. can lead to over-exaggerated control and monitoring of all kinds of
enterprises. In countries with traditions of corruption, oftentimes, military rules are
imposed in political and economic processes that can become anti-productive and
restrictive. Small-business investment, credit loans are excessively regulated to monitor
bribery and other corruption related activities. Thus the presence of trust, which
conversely indicate the absence of corruption, leads to opportunities for economic growth
because the hindrances of growth are removed in such situations.

Hypothesis11: Belongingness is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for
both developed and developing nations.
It can be argued that social capital in the form of belongingness increases physical
capital by creating increased access to resources and translation of those resources to
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productive investment for growth. Social capital increases human capital through
exchange of influential ideas, building of cooperative trust funds for education, opening
up channels through secondary and tertiary networks and memberships for educational
incentives which directly influence economic growth.

Description of the Variables In this Research:

Economic growth – The dependent variable is economic growth measured in
terms of gross domestic product (GDP) at ‘purchasing power parity’ of nations. The
economic growth variable, is however a flow variable which is used to measure the
percentage change in growth rates over longitudinal data. In the current study, the GDP is
measured in terms of the output per worker for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000 which is a
stock variable and is thus used as a proxy for economic growth. Thus the proxy variable
of output per worker at specific points in time is more likely indicative of economic
activities of nations and not the measure of economic growth in the strict sense of the
term.
The GDP data for all the countries in the model are derived from WDI 2003
published by the World Bank. GDP in the 2003 WDI is labeled as “growth of output” and
defined by the World Bank “as the sum of gross value added by resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of the
output. Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and
subtracting immediate inputs”. Purchasing power parity (PPP) establishes the standard
for purchasing power conversions in terms of US $ for individual nations. In other words,
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the PPP rates provide comparison of real price levels between countries such that a peso,
or a pound or a yen can be translated to a value in US $ in terms of the goods, products
and services it can buy. The PPP conversion factors used in the 2003 WDI are derived
from the price surveys covered by the International Comparison Programme covering
118 countries. Economic growth for countries is obtained for years 1980, 1990 and 2000.
The data is assembled in Jerry Dwyer’s complete dataset available at the website:
www.jerrydwyer.com

with

a

data

appendix

available

at

http://www.jerrydwyer.com/pdf/dataapp.pdf

Physical capital – The physical capital per worker variable is also obtained from
the Jerry Dwyer compiled dataset. Jerry Dwyer’s data on physical capital comes from
International Historical Statistics: the Americas, 1750-1993, International Historical
Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750 – 1993, International Historical Statistics:
Europe, 1750-1993. The total physical capital of a country according to the World Bank
is “gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the
economy, net changes in the level of inventories and net acquisitions of valuables. Fixed
assets in this category include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains and so on);
plant, machinery and equipment purchases; the construction of roads, railways and the
like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial
and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary
or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and work in progress.” While the ‘gross
capital formation’ is the total physical capital of country, for the purpose of this research,
the variable ‘physical capital per worker’ will be used.The physical capital per worker
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has been recalculated by Jerry Dwyer by creating average investment rates of countries,
the growth rate of the labor force in countries and the annual depreciation rate on capital
is for a span of years. The years used for this research are 1980, 1990 and 2000.
The World Bank classifies economies broadly into three categories in terms of
their gross national income (GNI). The three categories of economies are: “high income”,
“middle income” and “low income”. Low and middle-income economies are referred by
the World Bank as “developing economies”. However, this does not imply that all
economies in a particular zone experience similar development or other economies have
reached a final stage of development. For example, simply considering the case of southeast Asia, we find huge growth differentials between Singapore, India, Nepal and
Indonesia in recent years. As GNI per capita changes over time, we find that the country
composition of income groups oftentimes change from one edition of the WDI to the next
leading to countries changing positions in the World Bank’s three-category classification
of economies. Low-income economies are categorized by the World Bank (2003) as
those countries having a GNI of $745 or less in 2001. Middle-income economies are
countries with a GNI per capita of more than $745 but less than $9,206. High-income
economies are countries with a GNI per capita of $9,206 or more. According to the
economic status of the countries, the World Bank also classifies countries in terms of
‘developed countries’ and ‘developing countries’. This classification will be used to
separate the developed and developing countries in latter chapters for the statistical
analyses.
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Human capital – The human capital per worker variables is also obtained from the Jerry
Dwyer dataset which used interpolated values of the share of the population between the
ages of 5 and 17 from the Dorling Kindersley World Reference Atlas (1994), and Keyfitz
and Flieger World Population Growth and Aging: Demographic Trends in the Late 20

th

Century (1990). These sources provides the age structure of the population for the age
groups 0-14, 15-64 and 65 and older. The calculation of the stock of human capital of
each type, primary school stock, secondary school stock and higher education stock
followed the use of we a perpetual inventory method and it expressed as a fraction of the
labor force (since the variable is human capital per worker). The primary school,
secondary school and higher education were thus determined for each worker per country
following the calculation of undepreciated labor force from the death rates of adults in the
country. The econometric calculation of this process can be found at pages A3 and A4 in
the document at http://www.jerrydwyer.com/pdf/dataapp.pdf

Economic freedom - The economic freedom indicators are derived from
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), 2004. Canada’s Fraser Institute publishes the
Economic Freedom of the World annually. The economic freedom index contains thirtyeight components designed to measure broadly the degree to which a nation’s institutions
and policies conform to practices of “voluntary exchange, protection of property rights,
open markets, and minimal regulation of economic activity”(Gwartney and Lawson;
2004). The Fraser Institute ranks countries around the world based on these broad criteria
of economic freedom.
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The EFW index provides current ratings for 123 countries with approximately
100 countries rated continuously (at five-year intervals) throughout 1980-2001 period.
The ratings are available also for a smaller sub-set of countries as far back as 1970. The
EFW dataset provides summary ratings for each country and individual ratings for
countries in five major areas: (1) size of government; expenditures, taxes and enterprises,
(2) legal structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4)
exchange with foreigners, and (5) regulation of capital, labor, and business. Within the
above mentioned five major areas of economic freedom, twenty-one components
constitute the economic freedom index and for a detailed break-down, many of these
components themselves are made up of several sub-components. With the inclusion of
the various sub-components, the EFW index has thirty-eight distinct pieces of data. Each
component and sub-component is placed on a scale from 0 to 10 with higher scores
indicating increasing magnitude of economic freedom. The ratings for each of the five
areas result from the average component ratings within each area. The overall summary
ratings are average of the five area ratings. The higher the score on components, subcomponents of the area ratings and the average of the five area ratings, the higher is the
rating in economic freedom indices. The final measure of economic freedom ratings is
the economic freedom rating score in all the five areas of mean economic freedom of
each country in 1980, 1990 and 2000. A comprehensive list of all the components and
sub-components of the economic freedom index is available in Table 4 below.
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Table 4: The Areas and Components of the EFW Index (Source: Economic Freedom of
the World, 2004)

1.

Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises
A. General Government consumption, spending as a percentage of total consumption.
B. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP.
C. Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP.
D. Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies).
i)
Top marginal income tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies).
ii)
Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (and income threshold at which
it applies).

2.

Legal structure and Security of Property Rights
A. Judicial Independence: the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the
government or parties in disputes (GCR).
B. Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the
legality of government actions or regulation (GCR).
C. Protection of intellectual property.
D. Military interference in rule of law and the political process (ICRG).
E. Integrity of the legal system.

3.

Access to Sound Money
A. Average annual growth of the money supply in the past five years minus average annual
growth of real GDP in the past ten years.
B. Standard inflation variability in the past five years.
C. Recent inflation rate.
D. Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad.

4.

Freedom to Trade Internationally
A. Taxes on international trade.
i)
Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus
imports.
ii)
Mean tariff rate.
iii)
Standard deviation of tariff rates.
B. Regulatory trade barriers.
i)
Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs and
quotas (GCR).
ii)
Costs of importing: the combined effects of import tariffs, license fees,
bank fees, and the time required for administrative red tape raises costs of
importing equipment by (10 = 10 percent or less; 0 = more than 50
percent) (GCR)
C. Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size.
D. Difference between official exchange rate and black-market rate.
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Table 4 (continued)
E. International capital-market controls.
i)
Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to
domestic capital markets (GCR).
ii)
Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital-market
exchange with foreigners – index of capital controls among thirteen
International Monetary Fund categories.

5.

Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Buisness
A. Credit-Marker Regulations
i)
Ownership of banks: Percentage of deposits held in privately owned
banks.
ii)
Competition: domestic banks face competition from foreign banks
(GCR).
iii)
Extension of credit: percentage of credit extended to private sector.
iv)
Avoidance of interest-rate controls and regulations that lead to negative
real interest rates.
v)
Interest-rate controls: interest rate controls on bank deposits and /or loans
are freely determined by the market (GCR).
B. Labor-Market Regulations
i)
Impact of minimum wage: the minimum wage, set by law, has little
impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed (GCR).
ii)
Hiring and firing practices: hiring and firing practices of companies are
determined by private contract (GCR).
iii)
Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective
bargaining (GCR).
iv)
Unemployment Benefits: the unemployment benefits system preserves
the incentive to work (GCR).
v)
Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel.
C. Business Regulations
i)
Price controls: extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices.
ii)
Administrative conditions and new businesses: administrative procedures
are an important obstacle to starting a new business (GCR).
iii)
Time with government bureaucracy: senior management spends a
substantial amount of time dealing with government bureaucracy (GCR).
iv)
Starting a new business: starting a new business is generally easy (GCR).
v)
Irregular payments: irregular, additional payments connected with import
and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments,
police protection, or loan applications are very rare (GCR).

GCR = Global Competitiveness Report
ICRG = International Country Risk Guide
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Social capital – The social capital variable is obtained from the World Values
Survey (WVS) 1981, 1991, 1995-’97 and 1999-2002. Social capital variable in the WVS
is measured in terms of i) a trust variable and ii) the membership in eight different kinds
of organizations as economic, political, church, youth, environment, health, sports and
other. The construction of the trust variable follows the question: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted?” The answer options for this question are
‘yes’ and ‘no’ which makes trust a ‘binary variable’ in the data. The construction of the
belongingness/membership variable for each organization follows the question for that
organization, an example of which is “Do you belong to a religious organization?” The
answer

options

for

this

question

are

‘yes’

and

‘no’

which

makes

the

belongingness/membership a ‘binary variable’ in the data. Data for trust and membership
is available at the level of individual person for each country. Therefore, for the purpose
of this study, the data will be aggregated at the national level for each country and the
percentage change in trust and membership for the years1980, 1990 and 200 will be
noted as mean of ‘yes’ category responses for both these variables.
The World Values Surveys are a set of inter-cultural studies based on interviews
of population samples for various countries around the world. The World Values Surveys
originated from the European Values Survey (EVS) conducted in ten West European
societies by the European Value Systems Study Group (EVSSG) and initiated by
Professor Ronald Inglehart of Ann Arbor, Michigan. Following the EVS, the World
Value Survey was globally initiated later by Inglehart and his chief executive committee
members, Bi Puranen and Thorleif Pettersson. Most of the survey questions in both these
surveys are information-related questions about attitudes and values of respondents, in a
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number of different areas, drawn from representative samples with different economic,
educational, and cultural backgrounds. The surveys typically cover 300-4000 respondents
per country and use stratified, multi-stage random probability sampling of adult citizens
aged 18 years and older. Some of the other sampling procedures used in the survey
include cluster sampling, multistage sampling using the Kish-grid method, purposive
sampling, and quota sampling.
To date, there have been four waves of surveys conducted in the World Values
Survey: 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 1995-1997, and 1999-2001. The title of the series was
differentiated into World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys with the addition
of the 1995-1997 data. The most recent wave covers over 60 countries providing globally
representative data drawn from national samples of the people of 81 societies containing
approximately 85 percent of the world’s population. Such a full and global range of
variation not only includes nations with different income capacities but also different
politico-cultural and economic systems ranging from democracies to authoritarian states,
and from societies with market economies to societies that are in the process of emerging
from state-run economies.

Data Description and Organization in the Research
The longitudinal data used for this research, as mentioned in the last chapter are
derived principally from three main sources namely the Fraser Institute, Jerry Dwyer’s
expansion of the Summer and Heston data and World Values Survey. A matrix table
constructed for all the countries across these datasets revealed that while the Fraser
Institute and Jerry Dwyer’s data included a wide range of countries for the period of
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1980, the World Values Survey had only a limited coverage of countries in the 1980 data.
Moreover, some of the countries covered in the World Values Data 1980-84 did not
match with the data derived from the other two sources, so many countries included in
the World Values data ended up with missing values for many independent variables
derived from the other two data sources.
While a total of 123 countries are covered consistently in the Fraser Institute data
for measuring economic freedom for 1980, 1990 and 2000, and a total of 143 countries
are consistently covered (with limited missing values) in the Jerry Dwyer’s data for
economic growth, labor force participation, human capital and physical capital for 1980,
1990 and 2000, the World Values Survey covers a total of 24 countries for the first wave
1980-84, 43 countries for the second wave 1989-93, 65 countries for the third wave 199499 and 82 countries for the fourth wave 1999-2004.
Another limiting factor for collecting social capital data for 1980 is that the
concept of social capital being relatively new and unused in the 80’s with debates about
the appropriate measurements, World Values Survey is the only global scale survey data
covering samples in countries in that period of time. No other survey has been done on a
global scale with fuller coverage on social capital variables other than the World Values
Survey. Social capital research in the 1980’s either cover information about specific
communities within specific countries or just specific countries geared towards special
projects funded by governmental and non-governmental organizations. The World Bank,
for example launched its major social capital projects for the developing world targeting
specific countries on the whole like Philippines, Vietnam etc. or specific communities in
the countries like Tanzania, India etc. However, the data collection process for all the
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countries are not found in any major dataset in the period of 1980 to allow us either to
work on the data or make cross-national longitudinal studies including the 1980 data for a
social capital variable. A cross-listing of countries across the datasets as illustrated in
Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 will demonstrate the limited usability of the 1980 World
Values Survey data in our study.
Another note regarding the World Values Survey data is that for each of the four
waves of the survey, the data collection process has extended over a period of 3-5 years,
so the first wave data has been collected for 3 years, the second wave data has been
collected for 4 years, the third wave data has been collected for 5 years and the fourth
wave data has been collected for 5 years as well. The Jerry Dwyer data and the Fraser
Institute data unlike the World Values Survey data, has been collected at specific points
in time as the 1980, 1990 and 2000. For the purpose of this study, the first wave data
from the World Values Survey will be matched with the 1980 data from Jerry Dwyer and
the Fraser Institute data, the second wave data of the World Values Survey will be
matched with the 1990 data from Jerry Dwyer and the Fraser Institute data and the third
wave data from the World Values Survey will be matched with the 2000 data from Jerry
Dwyer and the Fraser Institute. This should not be a limiting factor in the research since
there is considerable time gap between each of the four waves in the World Values
Survey to compare statistical changes across the data.
Data collected for some of the countries in the Jerry Dwyer dataset are not exactly
in the years 1980, 1990 and 2000 but a year or two apart from these specific dates. The
data for Australia are for the years 1981, 1991 and 2000; the data for China are for the
years 1982, 1990 and 2000; the data for France are for the years 1980, 1991 and 2000;
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the data for Morocco are for the years 1982, 1990 and 2000; the data for Pakistan are for
the years 1981, 1991 and 2000 and the data for Russia are for the years 1980, 1989 and
2000. The important point about the data is that each specific data time point is set apart
from one another by a span of 8-10 and thus it is not a limiting factor for the study. The
1981 and 1982 data points in the Jerry Dwyer dataset is matched against the 1980 data
points across all the three datasets and 1989 and the 1991 data specifics in the Jerry
Dwyer data is matched against the 1990 data points across all the three datasets
The total number of common countries present in the Fraser Institute data, Jerry
Dwyer data and the World Values survey are 10 for the year 1980, 30 for the year 1990
and 36 for the year 2000. From the common set of countries included in the 1980 and
1990 data, the sub-set of countries common between the 1980 and 1990 data are only 10
– Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United
Kingdom and the United States. Also from the common set of countries included in the
1990 and 2000 data, the sub-set of countries common between the 1990 and 2000 data
are a total of 17 – Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States.
One important note regarding the 1980 data across all the datasets is that due to the
limited number of observations available in the first wave (1980-84) of World Values
Survey, the 10 common countries included across all the datasets are developed
countries. In the 1990 data across all the datasets which include 30 common countries,
there are approximately 13 countries that can be considered developing countries and 17
countries that can be considered developed countries. The countries that can be
considered developing countries in all of the datasets in 1990 are Argentina, Brazil,
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Bulgaria, Chile, China, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia and
Slovak Republic accounting for about 43% of the total number of common countries in
the 1990 dataset. In the 2000 data across all the datasets that include 36 common
countries, there are approximately 24 countries that can be considered developing
countries and 12 countries that can be considered developed countries. The developing
countries in all the datasets in 2000 are Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Hungary,
India, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey,
Uruguay and Venezuela accounting for 67% of the total number of common countries in
the 2000 dataset. The observation for the 1980 dataset is thus heavily skewed towards
developing countries and will have limited use for purposes of comparison with other
waves. It is noteworthy that as one goes from the 1980 to 1990 and 2000 datasets, the
presence of developing countries becomes much larger as can be noted from Tables 1, 2
and 3 below.

Table 5: Common countries included in all the datasets for 1980, 1990 and 2000
1980
1. Belgium
2. Canada
3. Denmark
4. France
5. Ireland
6. Italy
7. Netherlands
8. Sweden
9. United Kingdom
10. United States
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Table 5 (continued)
1990
1. Argentina
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. Brazil
5. Bulgaria
6. Canada
7. Chile
8. China
9. Denmark
10. Finland
11. France
12. Germany
13. Hungary
14. Ireland
15. Italy
16. Japan
17. Korea
18. Mexico
19. Netherlands
20. Norway
21. Poland
22. Portugal
23. Romania
24. Russia
25. Slovakia
26. Spain
27. Sweden
28. Switzerland
29. United Kingdom
30. United States
2000
1. Albania
2. Argentina
3. Australia
4. Bangladesh
5. Brazil
6. Bulgaria
7. Chile
8. China
9. Taiwan
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Table 5 (continued)
10. Colombia
11. Czech Republic
12. Dominican Republic
13. El Salvador
14. Finland
15. Germany
16. Hungary
17. India
18. Japan
19. Korea
20. Latvia
21. Lithuania
22. Mexico
23. New Zealand
24. Nigeria
25. Peru
26. Philippines
27. Romania
28. Russia
29. South Africa
30. Spain
31. Sweden
32. Switzerland
33. Turkey
34. Uruguay
35. United States
36. Venezuela
Table 6: Countries common between 1980 and 1990 (10)
1. Belgium
2. Canada
3. Denmark
4. France
5. Ireland
6. Italy
7. Netherlands
8. Sweden
9. United Kingdom
10. United States
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Table 7: Countries common between 1990 and 2000 (17)
1. Argentina
2. Brazil
3. Bulgaria
4. Chile
5. China
6. Finland
7. Germany
8. Hungary
9. Japan
10. Korea
11. Mexico
12. Romania
13. Russia
14. Spain
15. Sweden
16. Switzerland
17. United States

Data Management, Data Recoding, Data Merging and Data Stacking
After listing the common countries across the datasets, I worked with three
different datasets for 1980, 1990 and 2000 and created three separate files for each year.
The World Values Survey dataset for the year 1980 was first sorted and weighted and
then aggregated from individual level data to country level data by using the “aggregate”
function in SPSS with the break variables s003 (country code) and s024 (country and
wave). The data was aggregated on mean trust and mean belongingness of countries for
the first, second and third waves. The original trust variable in the World Values Survey
is coded as (1= trust, 2= need to be careful, -1=don’t know”, -2=no answer, -3= not
applicable, -4= not asked, -5= missing; unknown). To get a binary category of those who
trust and those who need to be careful, the trust variable was recoded {1= need to be
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careful, 2= trust, allelse=sysmis}. Following this, the World Values Survey data for 1980
was aggregated at the level of mean for each country for trust (a165) and a list of
belongingness variables like belongingness to social welfare (a064), belongingness to
religious groups (a065), belongingness to educations/arts/music or cultural activities
(a066), belongingness to labor unions (a067), belongingness to political parties (a068),
belongingness to youth groups (a073). The other belongingness variables such as
belongingness

to

professional

organizations,

belongingness

to

animal

rights

organizations, belongingness to human rights organizations have been left out because
they have either missing data or missing values in the 1980 and 1990 World Values
dataset. The 6 belongingness variables listed above were included (as part of
belongingness measure) without either missing data or missing values consistently in
both the 1980 and 1990 surveys. The belongingness variable for each social category was
originally a binary category in the WVS coded as (1=belong, 0=not belong). The original
code of belongingness was used for subsequent analysis as a binary variable. The
aggregation process was followed by creating three separate files for mean trust and
mean belongingness for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000.
A mean of mean belongingness (Belong_mean) for each country in 1980 (as listed
in Table 5) was constructed by combining (a064 + a065 + a066 + a067 + a068 + a073)/6.
These six variables for belongingness was used to match with 1990 WVS data and
selected on the bases of occurrence in 1980, 1990 and 2000 WVS. Then a log of
(Belong_mean) was created and named as a variable (Belong_meanln). For the regression
analyses of the data, the variable (Belong_meanln) would be used as a summative
measure of log of mean belongingness to different social groups for each country in
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1980. For the trust variable, after computing the mean of trust (Trust_mean), a log value
for mean trust was created as a new variable (Trust_meanln) for entering into the final
regression analysis.
The 1980 data for economic freedom sub-area rankings was obtained from the
excel file available at - http://www.freetheworld.com/2005/2005Dataset.xls. The 1980
data containing the area rankings of area 1 (size of government), area 2 (legal structure
and security of property rights), area 3 (access to sound money), area 4 (freedom to trade
internationally) and area 5 (regulation of credit, labor and business) were saved into a
separate excel file and exported to SPSS and saved as a SPSS file for 1980 with five
variable as Ar1, Ar2, Ar3, Ar4, Ar5 respectively for the areas. A mean of the economic
freedom rankings of countries for year 1980 was obtained by (Ar1 + Ar2 + Ar3 + Ar4 +
Ar5)/5. The new variable of mean economic freedom rankings was named (EF_mean). A
log of EF_mean is computed as a variable (EF_meanln) to be used in the final regression
analysis. The logs of Trust_mean, Belong_mean and EF_mean are created for regression
analysis because typically the Cobb-Douglas function used to calculate ‘output’ (the
dependent variable) in the study are done using log of physical capital, human capital,
labor force etc. It is important to note that all the data management was done with units of
analyses as countries, so the logs of mean trust, economic freedom and belongingness
were computed at the country level. The economic freedom data for each country was
given the country code as per the country code in World Values Survey, therefore
country code (s003) was used as another variable in this dataset.
The 1980 data for output per worker per country, physical capital per worker per
country, human capital per worker per country, country and the year variable were
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selected and saved into an excel file and exported into a SPSS file where they were
named respectively as Output_ln, Phycap_ln, Humcap_ln and country code. These data
were available at - http://www.jerrydwyer.com/pdf/bdt200404.xls The variable
country_code (equivalent to s003 of WVS) was created for all the data files for 1980. The
three files for 1980 from the World Values Survey data, the Fraser Institute data website
and the Jerry Dwyer data website were now merged to get a compiled data file with all
the variables – social capital variables, economic freedom variables, output, physical
capital and human capital. These three data files were merged replicating country code
(s003) variable from WVS into all the three datasets. The country codes (variable s003)
used for merging the three files for 1980 and subsequently 1990 and 2000 were as
follows:

Table 8: List of Country Codes from World Values Survey used to merge data-files
1. Albania (8)
2. Argentina (32)
3. Australia (36)
4. Austria (40)
5. Bangladesh (50)
6. Belgium (56)
7. Brazil (76)
8. Bulgaria (100)
9. Canada (124)
10. Chile (152)
11. China (156)
12. Taiwan (158)
13. Colombia (170)
14. Czech Republic (203)
15. Denmark (208)
16. Dominican Republic (214)
17. El Salvador (222)
18. Finland (246)
19. France (250)
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Table 8 (continued)
20. Germany (276)
21. Hungary (348)
22. India (356)
23. Ireland (372)
24. Italy (380)
25. Japan (392)
26. Latvia (428)
27. Lithuania (440)
28. Mexico (484)
29. Netherlands (528)
30. New Zealand (554)
31. Nigeria (566)
32. Pakistan (586)
33. Peru (604)
34. Philippines (608)
35. Poland (616)
36. Portugal (620)
37. Romania (642)
38. Russia (643)
39. Slovak Republic (703)
40. South Africa (710)
41. South Korea (715)
42. Spain (724)
43. Sweden (752)
44. Switzerland (756)
45. Turkey (792)
46. United Kingdom (826)
47. United States (840)
48. Uruguay (858)
49. Venezuela (862)
The set of operations discussed in the preceding paragraphs were repeated for
years 1990 and 2000 to obtain the mean of social capital variables (trust and
belongingness), economic freedom variables (five areas and mean economic freedom),
output per worker, physical capital per worker and human capital per worker. The logs of
the mean values were computed for social capital and economic freedom. The variables
were named and all the cases for 1980, 1990 and 2000 files were stacked together in a file
87

named (allstackedwithlogs.sav) by using the SPSS function “add cases”. The final files to
be used for statistical analyses were: a) an all data merged file for 1980 (stacked80. sav),
b) an all data merged file for 1990 (stacked90.sav), c) an all data merged file for 2000
(stacked2000.sav) and d) an all data stacked file including a, b and c
(allstackedwithlogs.sav). The total number of cases in file (d) was 76 including 37
developing countries and 39 developed countries.
In the World Values Survey, data on membership variable and belongingness
variable is not available together for 1980 (first wave), 1990(second wave) and 2000
(third wave). The availability of the data is indicated in the table below:

Data availability of Belongingness and Membership in WVS
World

Values World

Values World

Values

Survey

Survey

Survey

(1980)

(1990)

(2000)

Belongingness

Yes

Yes

No

Membership

Yes

No

Yes

Since the belongingness and the membership data do not appear simultaneously in
all the data-files and questions in belongingness are exactly in the same form as questions
in the membership category, these have been used interchangeably for the purpose of this
research. In other words, the six belongingness variables (social welfare, religion, arts,
labor, political parties, youth) have been matched for 1980 and 1990 variables with the
2000 data for six membership variables (charity, church, arts, labor, political parties,
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youth). Illustrated below is the list of belongingness and membership variables that were
used for 1980, 1990 and 2000 data and the matching process. In the 1990 data,
membership variable was recoded as {1=active/inactive member, 0=not a member}.

List of Belongingness Variables used from WVS 1980 and 1990
a064 – belong to social welfare service
a065 – belong to religious organizations
a066 – belong to arts/music/education or cultural activities
a067 – belong to labor unions
a068 – belong to political parties
a073 – belong to youth work

List of Membership Variables used from WVS 2000
a105 – membership in charitable or humanitarian organizations
a098 – membership in church or religious organizations
a100 – membership in arts/music/education or cultural activities
a101 – membership in labor unions
a102 – membership in political parties
a099 – belong to sport/youth work
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Matching of the Belongingness and Membership Variables
WVS (1980: belongingness)

WVS(1980: belongingness)

WVS(2000: membership)

1. Social welfare

Social welfare

Charity

2. Religion

Religion

Church/Religion

3. Arts/Music/Edu

Arts/Music/Edu

Arts/Music/Edu

4. Labor

Labor

Labor

5. Political Parties

Political Parties

Political Parties

6. Youth

Youth

Sports/Youth

The belongingness and the membership variables obtained from the World Values
Survey match the categories within each specific variable. It was noted that for years
when data on membership were covered, the data on belongingness was not and vie
versa. The current research uses these two terms interchangeably as the measures of both
are logically consistent and should not affect the outcomes of this research. This chapter
has elaborately discussed the methodology which will be used for the purpose of this
research. This chapter is thus a useful transition from the discussion of the research
question to the actual findings of the research in elaborating the methodological goals
that inform this research.
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CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS

This chapter will provide a review of the descriptive statistics of social capital and
economic freedom of countries for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. The descriptive
statistics will be used primarily to describe the basic features of the data included in the
study. In this way, both the differences in distribution among components of social
capital and economic freedom can be understood in specific years and across the years.
Following the descriptive statistics, three sets of correlation tables will be analyzed for
the years 1990 (including 30 cases), 2000 (including 36 cases) and all the years
(including 76 cases). Since the year 1980 has only 10 cases all of which are developed
countries, no important contributions regarding correlations are made by the dataset for
1980 without biased estimates for the set of correlations. The correlation tables for 1990,
2000 and the overall years will include 1) correlation between mean trust and five areas
of economic freedom, 2) correlation between mean trust and categories of mean
belongingness, 3) correlation between categories of mean belongingness and the five
areas of economic freedom. For each of the years, the correlation tables will then be
summarized in terms of general observations, trend and patterns emerging out of these
tables. Following from the summary generalization of the correlation tables for all the
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years (1990, 2000 and all the years including all the cases), the status of the correlation
hypothesis H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 will be determined and explained.

Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital and Economic Freedom: Discussion
A descriptive statistics of social capital among countries, as seen in Table 9a in
the year 1980 (10 cases) show us that the maximum mean trust for this year is for
Sweden while the minimum is for France. The mean value for this variable in 1980 is 1.4.
Regarding mean belongingness to welfare organizations, France and Italy shows the
minimum value and Canada shows the maximum value. The maximum value of mean
belongingness to religion is shown by US while Denmark and France has the minimum
value. The maximum value of mean belongingness to arts/education/culture is shown by
US while Italy has the minimum. Regarding belongingness to labor organizations, Italy
has the lowest mean belongingness to labor organizations while Sweden has the
maximum belongingness. The minimum value of mean belongingness to political parties
is shown by France while Sweden has the maximum value. The minimum value of mean
belongingness to youth/sports organizations is shown by Italy while US has the
maximum value. Both the mean trust and the mean belongingness for the year 1980 are
for developed countries which allow us to compare the distribution of these variables in
different countries relative to one another.
Table 9b lists the descriptive statistics of countries in the five areas of economic
freedom as well as the mean of economic freedom as a total measure of all the five areas.
In Area 1 – size of the government, Sweden shows the minimum score while US shows
the highest score. In Area 2 – legal structure and property rights, Italy shows the
92

minimum score and US shows the highest score. In Area 3 – access to sound money, Italy
shows the minimum score and Netherlands shows the highest score. In Area 4 – freedom
to trade internationally, France shows the minimum score and US shows the highest
score. In Area 5 – regulation of credit, labor and business, Italy shows the minimum score
and the US shows the highest score. The highest mean economic freedom is for the US
with a while Sweden and Italy has the lowest mean economic freedom of. One significant
observation that can be made from the distribution figures is that among the developed
countries in 1980, Italy consistently ranks low in the area of legal structure and property
rights, access to sound money and regulation of credit, labor and business.
Table 9a: 1980 – Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital (10 cases)
Total number Min Max Mean SD
of countries
1. Mean Trust
2. Mean Welfare
3. Mean Religion
4. Mean Arts/Edu/
Culture
5. Mean Labor
6. Mean Political
Parties
7. Mean Youth/
Sports
8. Mean
Belongingness

10
10
10
10

1.24 1.57
.04
.13
.04
.55
.04
.14

10
10

.08
.02

.44
.14

.19 .13
.07 .03

10

.02

.12

.07

.03

10

.05

.20

.11

.05
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1.41 .11
.08 .04
.21 .17
.09 .03

Table 9b: 1980 – Descriptive Statistics of Economic Freedom (10 cases)
N
Area 1 - Size of
Government
Area 2 - Legal
Structure and
Property Rights
Area 3 - Access
to Sound Money
Area 4 Freedom to
Trade
Area 5 Regulation of
Credit, Labor
and Business
Mean Economic
Freedom
Valid N (listwise)

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

10

2.10

5.20

3.8100

.91948

10

5.70

8.30

7.1100

.69992

10

5.30

9.50

7.4800

1.70281

10

6.60

9.00

7.9260

.92453

10

4.80

6.80

5.8300

.61292

10

5.68

7.70

6.4312

.71434

10

From Table 10a, substituting the maximum and minimum values for the
countries, we find that the maximum mean trust for this year is for Sweden while the
minimum is for Brazil. Regarding the mean of belongingness to welfare/charity
organizations, Argentina, Romania and Russia shows the minimum value and
Netherlands shows the maximum mean belongingness value. The maximum value of
mean belongingness to religion is shown by US while Russia has the minimum value.
The maximum value of mean belongingness to arts/education/culture is shown by
Netherlands while Romania and Poland has the lowest value. Regarding belongingness to
labor organizations, Argentina has the lowest mean belongingness to labor organizations
while Russia has the maximum belongingness to labor organizations. The minimum
value of mean belongingness to political parties is shown by Hungary, Japan, Poland and
Spain with a value while China has the maximum value. The minimum value of mean
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belongingness to youth/sports organizations is shown by Romania while Netherlands has
the maximum value in mean belongingness to youth/sports organizations.
Table 10b lists the descriptive statistics of countries in the five areas of economic
freedom as well as the mean of economic freedom as a total measure of all the five areas.
From Table 10b, substituting the maximum and minimum values for the countries, we
know that for the mean of Area 1 – size of the government, Russia shows the minimum
score while Mexico shows the highest score. Regarding the mean of Area 2 – legal
structure and property rights, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and US show the maximum score and Russia shows the lowest
score. Regarding the mean of Area 3 – access to sound money, Brazil shows
the minimum score and Japan shows the highest score. For the mean of Area 4 – freedom
to trade internationally, Romania and Bulgaria shows the minimum score and Belgium
shows the highest score. Regarding the mean of Area 5 – regulation of credit, labor and
business, Romania shows the minimum score while the US and UK show the highest
score. The most compelling case of consistent low economic freedom in Area 1, 2, 4 and
5 is that of the east European countries of Russia, Romania and Bulgaria which also have
low scores in mean belongingness to social organizations in 1990.
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Table 10a: 1990 – Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital (30 cases)
N
Mean Trust
Mean Welfare
Mean Religion
Mean
Arts/Edu/Culture
Mean Labor
Mean Political
Parties
Mean Youth
Organizations
Mean
Belongingness
Valid N (listwise)

30
30
30

Minimum
1.07
.02
.01

Maximum
1.66
.16
.49

Mean
1.3873
.0623
.1397

Std. Deviation
.15761
.03481
.11019

30

.02

.34

.0990

.06743

30

.01

.62

.1810

.16693

30

.02

.35

.0760

.06431

30

.02

.23

.1003

.06122

30

.04

.23

.1097

.05266

30

Table 10b: 1990 – Descriptive Statistics of Economic Freedom (30 cases)
N
Area 1 - Size of
Government
Area 2 - Legal
Structure and
Property Rights
Area 3 - Access
to Sound Money
Area 4 Freedom to
Trade
Area 5 Regulation of
Credit, Labor
and Business
Mean Economic
Freedom
Valid N (listwise)

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

30

1.20

7.20

4.4567

1.63067

30

3.50

8.30

7.2000

1.26491

30

.00

9.70

7.2700

2.59962

30

4.20

8.70

6.7480

1.41967

30

2.50

6.80

5.1600

1.14096

30

3.84

7.84

6.1669

1.19351

30

For Table 11a, the description of the countries with the maximum and minimum
values in the area of social capital follows for 2000. The maximum mean trust for this
year is for Sweden while the minimum is for Brazil. The minimum value for the mean of
belongingness to welfare/charity organizations is for Russia and the US shows the
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maximum mean value. The maximum value of mean belongingness to religion is shown
by South Africa while Bulgaria has the minimum mean value. The maximum value of
mean belongingness to arts/education/culture is shown by Mexico while Bulgaria has the
lowest value. Regarding belongingness to labor organizations, El Salvador has the lowest
mean belongingness to labor organizations while Sweden has the maximum
belongingness to labor organizations. The lowest value of mean belongingness to
political parties is shown by Russia while United States has the maximum value. The
minimum value of mean belongingness to youth/sports organizations is shown by
Bulgaria while New Zealand has the maximum value. On the whole, the mean
belongingness to social organizations is highest for the US and the lowest for Turkey.
For Table 11b, the description of the countries with the maximum and minimum
values in the area of economic freedom follows for 2000. For the mean of Area 1 – size
of the government, Sweden shows the minimum score while Dominican Republic shows
the highest score. Regarding the mean of Area 2 – legal structure and property rights,
Finland shows the maximum score and Bangladesh and Colombia shows the lowest
score. For the mean of Area 3 – access to sound money, Romania shows the minimum
score and the United States shows the highest score. Regarding the mean of Area 4 –
freedom to trade internationally, Bangladesh shows the minimum score and Germany
shows the highest score. As for the mean of Area 5 – regulation of credit, labor and
business, Russia shows the minimum score and the US shows the highest score. Romania
shows the minimum value for the mean score of economic freedom and the US shows the
maximum value for the mean score of economic freedom.
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Table 11a: 2000 – Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital (36 cases)
N
Mean Trust
Mean Welfare
Mean Religion
Mean
Arts/Edu/Culture
Mean Labor
Mean Political
Parties
Mean Youth
Organizations
Mean
Belongingness
Valid N (listwise)

36
36
36

Minimum
1.03
.01
.03

Maximum
1.60
.42
.88

Mean
1.2728
.1511
.4028

Std. Deviation
.13948
.10954
.24025

36

.03

.41

.1933

.11883

36

.02

.63

.1828

.12256

36

.02

.50

.1450

.11039

36

.04

.58

.2656

.15506

36

.05

.46

.2234

.11354

36

Table 11b: 2000 – Descriptive Statistics of Economic Freedom (36 cases)
N
Area 1 - Size of
Government
Area 2 - Legal
Structure and
Property Rights
Area 3 - Access
to Sound Money
Area 4 Freedom to
Trade
Area 5 Regulation of
Credit, Labor
and Business
Mean Economic
Freedom
Valid N (listwise)

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

36

3.00

8.60

6.0000

1.43786

36

3.50

9.50

6.1111

1.90844

36

2.70

9.80

7.6917

2.05306

36

5.10

8.70

7.2333

.94536

36

4.40

8.20

6.2000

.84211

36

4.86

8.58

6.6472

.99212

36

The data in Table 12 are the results of a one-way analysis of variance designed to
test for the differences in mean trust, belongingness and economic freedom within and
between developed and developing nations. The results suggest there are differences in
mean trust (F=17.33)and mean economic freedom (F=12.88) between developed and
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developing countries. There is no difference in mean belongingness between developed
and developing countries. Also, there are no significant differences in mean trust,
belongingness and economic freedom within developed countries as a group and
developing countries as the other group. The difference in mean economic freedom
between the developed and the developing countries can be assumed to be a result of the
differences in aggregate economic situations e.g. the developing countries witness blackmarket exchanges in currencies and products with very little vigilance, the property rights
of people are oftentimes disputed and are still adjusting to unclear legal standards, trade
in certain areas are highly restricted and government regulated and a host of other
problems that arrest the economic status of these countries. As a result of the fragmented
economic situations and governmental malfunctions in these countries, it is not surprising
that there would be a difference in trust among people in these countries from that of the
people in the developed societies.
Table 12: One-way ANOVA comparing difference of means between Developed and
Developing Countries in 1980, 1990 and 2000

Mean Trust

Mean Belong

Mean
Economic
Freedom

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
.339
1.446
1.784
.002
.786
.787
43.934
252.414

df
1
74
75
1
74
75
1
74

296.348

75
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Mean Square
.339
.020

F
17.335

Sig.
.000

.002
.011

.144

.705

43.934
3.411

12.880

.001

Correlations among Indicators of Social Capital and Economic Freedom
The correlations among the indicators of trust, economic freedom and
belongingness for 1990 are presented in Tables 13a, b, and c. In 1990 mean trust
positively correlates with four of five areas of economic freedom, mean economic
freedom, mean belongingness to five of the six groups/organizations but not to religious
groups. Of all the correlations between belongingness to different social categories, it is
interesting to note that mean belongingness to labor unions and political parties has no
correlations with mean belongingness to any other social groups (welfare, religion, arts or
sports). One could speculate in terms of sociology and social psychology if
belongingness to labor unions and political parties are due to specific instrumental
reasons like bargaining for wages, trade unions activities which are very different in
nature and quality from ritual gatherings in church, or celebrating an arts festival because
of like-minded social interests.
The relationship between belongingness to different social groups and areas of
economic freedom are mixed. Mean belongingness to social welfare, arts/music/cultural
organizations, and sports/youth organizations is positively correlated with four of the five
indicators of economic freedom and mean economic freedom. The greater the
belongingness to religious organizations the greater the size of the government,
regulation of credit, labor and business and mean economic freedom. Mean
belongingness to labor unions is negatively correlated with the size of the government.
Thus, the larger the relative size of unions is related to smaller government. This can be
interpreted to mean that when peoples’ participatory rights in government are less, their
needs to form external unions for political activism and the like will be stronger.
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Table 13a: Mean Trust and Five Areas of Economic Freedom correlation matrix (1990)
Mean
Trust

Size of
government

Legal
structure
and
Security
of
property
rights

Mean
1.00
Trust
.368∗
Size of
government
1.00
Legal
structure and
Security of
property
1.00
rights
Access to
Sound Money
Freedom to
Trade
Internationally
Regulation of
Credit, Labor
and Business
Mean
Economic
Freedom
∗.
Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Access
to
Sound
Money

.476∗∗

Freedom to
Trade
Internationally

.458∗

Regulation
of Credit,
Labor and
Business

Mean
Economic
Freedom

.397∗

.451∗

.485∗∗

.443∗

.521∗∗

.627∗∗

.620∗∗

.748∗∗

1.00

.640∗∗

.556∗∗

.792∗∗

1.00

.768∗∗

.871∗∗

1.00

.880∗∗
1.00
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Table 13b: Mean Trust and Categories of Mean Belongingness correlation matrix (1990)

Mean
Trust
Soc
Welfare
Religion
Arts/
Music/
Cultural
Labor
Union
Political
Parties

Mean
Trust

Soc
Welfare

1.00

.414∗
1.00

Religion

.547∗∗
1.00

Arts/
Music/
Cultural

Labor
Union

Political
Parties

Sports/
Youth

.563∗∗

.382∗

.537∗∗

.683∗∗

.699∗∗

.830∗∗
.645∗∗

.767∗∗
.522∗∗

.715∗∗
.548∗∗

1.00

.822∗∗

.800∗∗
.587∗∗

1.00

Sports/
Youth

∗.

.398∗

1.00
1.00

Mean
Belonging
∗∗.

Correlation is significant at the .05 level

Mean
Belonging

.868∗∗

1.00
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Table 13c: Mean Belongingness in Social Welfare, Religion, Arts, Labor Unions,
Political Parties, Youth work with Areas of Economic Freedom correlation
matrix (1990)
Size of
government

Legal
structure
and Security
of property
rights
.552∗∗

Soc
Welfare
Religion
.507∗∗
Arts/
Music/
.490∗∗
Cultural
Labor
-.692∗∗
Union
Political
Parties
Sports/
.585∗∗
Youth
Mean
Belonging
∗.
Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Access to
Sound
Money
.363∗

Freedom to
Trade
Internationally
.527∗∗

Regulation
of Credit,
Labor and
Business

Mean
Economic
Freedom

.481∗∗

.545∗∗

.517∗∗

.454∗

.480∗∗

.524∗∗

.516∗∗

.598∗∗

.560∗∗

.645∗∗

.600∗∗

.644∗∗

.444∗

.397∗
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.386∗

With a couple of exceptions, the relationship of mean trust to the five areas of
economic freedom and the relationships among the five economic freedom indicators in
the year 2000 are nearly identical to what was found for 1990 (compare Table 13a and
Table 14a). A most obvious difference is that mean trust is negatively associated with
size of government in 2000 but not in 1990. Trust is also not related to the regulation of
credit, labor and business in 2000. Of course, the number of countries included for the
year 2000 is significantly more in terms of the developing countries where less
participatory rights in governments, elections etc. preclude trust among people which
becomes visible from the correlations of trust and the size of the government in 2000.
The other two differences between these two tables concern the relationship among the
size of government and mean economic freedom; these relationships are not significant in
2000.
In 2000 trust is not associated with the various indicators of belongingness in the
same was as they were in 1990 (see Table 14b). There are several differences here. First,
the relationship between mean trust and mean belongingness to different social
organizations changes in the year 2000. In the year 2000, mean trust is positively
correlated only with mean belongingness to labor unions and sports/youth organizations.
This suggests that trust is not associated with belongingness to any of the other types of
organizations in 2000. This observation is consistent with the assumption that with the
inclusion of more developing countries in the year 2000, where the size of the
government is smaller, the participatory rights of the citizens are few and far between, the
trust of people significantly subside because government does not represent peoples’
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rights and the only way to vocalize instrumental concerns is through political and labor
unions.
Second, mean belongingness to political parties is associated with belonging to
social welfare, religious, and arts/music/educational organizations (see Table 14b). Third,
unlike the year 1990, mean belongingness to sports/youth organizations is associated with
both mean belongingness to labor unions and political parties. Considering the year 2000
and the fact that the overall level of arts, education and cultural attainments has generally
increased from that of the year 1990, it is not surprising that although trust has decreased
among people either as a result of repressive government rule or the shrinkage of the
government size as a result of the free play of the market economy, peoples’ participation
in cultural attainments has gone up simultaneously with their conscious awareness to
voice their political interests. Also, participation in religious movements and
organizations have increased from that of the previous decades as a result of
governmental policies and erosions; it might be assumed that when the state machinery
fails to provide public goods for public benefits, other institutions are formed and adhered
to fulfill such needs. This is true of the United States after the 9/11 incident where the
average religiosity among people has gone up as result of the threats of terrorism where
religion can provide a social anchor and also because of peoples’ need to express
religious differences in the event of religion-based national catastrophes.
Finally, there are fewer significant relationships among the indicators of
belongingness and the indicators of economic freedom in 2000 than there were in 1990
(compare Tables 13c and 14c). The remaining differences between the two years are not
patterned. In 2000, freedom to trade internationally is not related to belongingness to any
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type of organization, which is quite a contrast to 1990 when the former was related to
belonging to four types of organizations. Next, belonging to religious organizations is not
related to size of government or overall economic freedom in 2000 in contrast to 1990.
Belonging to arts/music/cultural groups is correlated with size of government in 2000 but
not associated with legal structure and security of property rights. However, belonging to
these latter groups was related to belonging to labor unions in 2000. Finally, in 2000
compare to 1990, mean belongingness is not associated with access to sound money but
is related to the regulation of credit, labor and business. The observations here (although
mixed in some instances) are more or less consistent with the patterns discussed in the
previous paragraphs which is essentially that of the new full-blown trend of economic
liberalization in nations, the decrease in participatory rights of people, the shrinkage of
the size of the government and the distance between the free market economy and the
size of the government.
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Table 14a: Mean Trust and Five Areas of Economic Freedom correlation matrix (2000)
Mean
Trust

Size of
government

Legal
structure
and
Security
of
property
rights

Mean
1.00
Trust
.690∗∗
-.414∗
Size of
government
1.00
Legal
structure and
Security of
property
1.00
rights
Access to
Sound Money
Freedom to
Trade
Internationally
Regulation of
Credit, Labor
and Business
Mean
Economic
Freedom
∗.
Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Access
to
Sound
Money

Freedom to
Trade
Internationally

Regulation
of Credit,
Labor and
Business

Mean
Economic
Freedom

.437∗∗

.416∗

.453∗∗

.555∗∗

.675∗∗

.687∗∗

.771∗∗

1.00

.485∗∗

.659∗∗

.882∗∗

1.00

.492∗∗

.659∗∗

1.00

.860∗∗
1.00
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Table 14b: Mean Trust and Categories of Mean Belongingness correlation matrix (2000)
Mean
Trust
Mean
Trust
Soc
Welfare
Religion
Arts/
Music/
Cultural
Labor
Union
Political
Parties
Sports/
Youth
Mean
Belonging

Soc
Welfare

Religion

Arts/
Music/
Cultural

Labor
Union

Political
Parties

.561∗∗

1.00
1.00

.706∗∗
1.00

Sports/
Youth

Mean
Belonging

.382∗

.842∗∗
.752∗∗

.471∗∗
.587∗∗

.839∗∗
.673∗∗

.871∗∗
.888∗∗

1.00

.559∗∗

.913∗∗

.920∗∗

.334∗

.444∗∗

.391∗

.652∗∗

1.00

.883∗∗

1.00
1.00

1.00

∗.

Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Table 14c: Mean Belongingness in Social Welfare, Religion, Arts, Labor Unions,
Political Parties, Youth work with Areas of Economic Freedom correlation
matrix (2000)
Size of
government

Legal
structure
and Security
of property
rights
.375∗

Soc
Welfare
Religion
Arts/
Music/
.394∗
Cultural
Labor
-.450∗∗
.383∗
Union
Political
Parties
Sports/
.456∗∗
Youth
Mean
Belonging
∗.
Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Access to
Sound
Money
.360∗

Freedom to
Trade
Internationally

Regulation
of Credit,
Labor and
Business
.555∗∗

Mean
Economic
Freedom
.515∗∗

.461∗∗
.340∗

.485∗∗

.453∗∗

.443∗∗

.530∗∗

.562∗∗

.522∗∗

.437∗∗
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The consistent finding that stands out in the correlation matrices of trust and
economic freedom for all the datasets is that mean trust is negatively correlated with the
size of the government. The other trend is that of mean belongingness becoming
increasingly associated with that of belonging to political unions and not any other social
category.
The sharpest differences in correlation findings among countries are that between
year 1990 and 2000. However, the differences observed between 1990 and 2000 do not
seem to be there for the overall matrix. Table 15 a, b, and c shows us that there are only
some minor differences in findings between the overall dataset and that of 2000 but they
seem minor.
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Table 15a: Mean Trust and Five Areas of Economic Freedom correlation matrix (All)
Mean
Trust

Size of
government

Legal
structure
and
Security
of
property
rights

Mean
1.00
Trust
.586∗∗
-.386∗∗
Size of
government
1.00
-.248∗
Legal
structure and
Security of
property
1.00
rights
Access to
Sound Money
Freedom to
Trade
Internationally
Regulation of
Credit, Labor
and Business
Mean
Economic
Freedom
∗.
Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Access
to
Sound
Money

.372∗∗

Freedom to
Trade
Internationally

Regulation
of Credit,
Labor and
Business

.308∗∗

Mean
Economic
Freedom

.309∗∗
.472∗∗

.392∗∗

.461∗∗

.489∗∗

.379∗∗

.610∗∗

1.00

.538∗∗

.560∗∗

.828∗∗

1.00

.620∗∗

.748∗∗

1.00

.844∗∗
1.00
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Table 15b: Mean Trust and Categories of Mean Belongingness correlation matrix (All
Years)
Mean
Trust
Mean
Trust
Soc
Welfare
Religion
Arts/
Music/
Cultural
Labor
Union
Political
Parties
Sports/
Youth

Soc
Welfare

Religion

Arts/
Music/
Cultural

Labor
Union

Political
Parties

Sports/
Youth

Mean
Belonging

.854∗∗
.774∗∗

.525∗∗
.565∗∗

.858∗∗
.745∗∗

.882∗∗
.876∗∗

1.00

.584∗∗

.905∗∗

.914∗∗

.446∗∗

1.00
1.00

.766∗∗
1.00

.352∗∗

1.00
1.00

.498∗∗

.678∗∗

1.00

.909∗∗

Mean
Belonging

1.00

∗.

Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Table 15c: Mean Belongingness in Social Welfare, Religion, Arts, Labor Unions,
Political Parties, Youth work with Areas of Economic Freedom correlation
matrix
Size of
government

Legal
structure
and Security
of property
rights

Soc
Welfare
.418∗∗
Religion
.515∗∗
Arts/
Music/
.475∗∗
Cultural
Labor
-.509∗∗
Union
Political
.286∗
Parties
Sports/
.408∗∗
Youth
Mean
.352∗∗
Belonging
∗.
Correlation is significant at the .05 level
∗∗.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level

Access to
Sound
Money

.312∗∗
.233∗∗

Freedom to
Trade
Internationally

.256∗

.369∗∗

.371∗∗
.327∗∗
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.277∗

Regulation
of Credit,
Labor and
Business

Mean
Economic
Freedom

.560∗∗
.574∗∗

.487∗∗
.399∗∗

.542∗∗

.501∗∗

.574∗∗

.511∗∗

.542∗∗

.428∗∗

Summary results of the correlation hypotheses
H1: Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is positively associated with
increased scores in the area of legal structure and security of property rights within
economic freedom.
H2: Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is associated with increased scores
in the area of access to sound money within economic freedom.
H3: Increase in mean trust is associated with increased scores in the area of freedom to
trade internationally within economic freedom.
From the correlation matrices including 30, 36 and 76 countries, it can be argued that
mean trust included in all the three datasets is correlated with mean economic freedom.
Mean trust correlates negatively with size of the government (both for 36 cases and 76
cases) and correlates positively at least three areas of economic freedom – legal structure
and security of property rights, access to sound money and freedom to trade
internationally for all the three datasets. Thus the above three hypotheses are accepted.
H4: Increase in mean trust is associated with increase in belongingness/membership in
social groups.
H5: Increase in mean trust is associated with decrease in belongingness/membership in
social groups.
From the correlation matrices including 30, 36 and 76 countries, it can be argued that
mean trust and mean belongingness are positively correlated. While the strength of the
correlation between the two varies over time, mean trust has positive correlations with
belonging to labor unions in all three datasets. Most importantly, there is a clear and
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observable disconnect between mean trust and mean belongingness to individual
organizations over time e.g. in 1990, mean trust correlates positively with mean
belongingness in five of the six different organizations – social welfare,
arts/education/music, labor unions, political parties and sports; in 2000, mean trust
correlates only with labor unions and sports/youth organizations while the dataset
covering 1980, 1990 and 2000 shows that mean trust is correlated positively with labor
unions only. In this case, although mean trust is positively associated with mean
belongingness, there is an observed disconnect between the two (in terms of the mean
belongingness in different social organizations) over time.
H6: Increase in mean belongingness/membership has positive association with the size of
the government, legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money,
regulation of credit, labor and business and mean economic freedom.
From the correlation matrices including 30, 36 and 76 countries, it can be argued that
mean belongingness in all the three datasets is correlated positively with mean economic
freedom.

However,

the

1990

dataset

with

30

countries

show

that

mean

belongingness/membership is correlated positively only with access to sound money and
freedom to trade internationally; the 2000 dataset shows that mean belongingness is
correlated positively only with regulation of credit, labor and business; the 1980, 1990
and 2000 dataset comprising of 76 countries show that mean belongingness/membership
is correlated positively with size of the government, access to sound money and
regulation of credit, labor and business. A very interesting observation (which is not part
of a hypothesis) that emanates from the correlation matrices for the dataset with 76
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countries is that mean trust and mean belongingness are correlated with different areas of
economic freedom.
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CHAPTER V
REGRESSION RESULTS AND ANALYSES

This chapter outlines the results of the bi-variate correlations among independent
variables and output per worker for both developed and developing nations. Finally, two
different regression tables are presented and analyzed for developed and developing
countries as per the hypotheses proposed in Chapter III related to multiple regression
analyses. Each of the regression tables for developed and developing countries will have
seven different models related to the different hypotheses testing in the models.
Table 16a: Bi-variate Correlation among the Independent Variables and Output per
Worker (Developed Countries: 39 cases)
Output
Output
Physical
Capital
Human
Capital
Time 2
(1990)
Time 3
(2000)
Trust
Belong
Economic
Freedom

1.00

Physical
Capital
.901∗∗
1.00

Human
Capital
.393∗

Time2(1
990)

Time3
(2000)

.394∗

Trust

Belong

.386∗
.377∗

1.00
1.00

Economic
Freedom
.468∗∗
.404∗

.322∗

.509∗∗

.695∗∗

.539∗∗
.376∗
1.00

.451∗∗

1.00

-.586∗∗
1.00

.582∗
1.00

The bi-variate correlation in Table 16a illustrates that output per capita is highly
positively correlated with physical capital. Output is also related positively with mean
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economic freedom and it has low positive correlation with human capital in developed
countries. Physical capital has low correlations with human capital, mean trust and mean
economic freedom. Human capital has low positive correlation with Time 3 (2000) and
mean trust and high positive correlations with belongingness and mean economic
freedom. Time 2 (1990) has strong negative correlations with Time 3 (2000). Time 3
(2000) has positive correlations with both mean belongingness in associations in
developed countries and mean economic freedom of developed countries. Trust has a low
positive correlation with belongingness while belongingness has high positive correlation
with economic freedom in developed countries.
Table 16b: Bi-variate Correlation among the Independent Variables and Output per
Worker (Developing Countries: 37 cases)
Output
Output
Physical
Capital
Human
Capital
Time 3
(2000)
Trust
Belong
Economic
Freedom

1.00

Physical
Capital
.935∗∗
1.00

Human
Capital
.820∗∗

Time3
(2000)

Trust

Belong

Economic
Freedom

.885∗∗
1.00
1.00

.615∗∗

.573∗∗

1.00

.473∗∗

1.00

1.00

The bi-variate correlation in Table 16b illustrates that output per worker is highly
positively correlated with both physical capital and human capital in developing
countries. Physical capital is highly positively correlated with human capital in
developing countries. From the table, we also see that Time 3 (2000) has strong positive
correlations with mean belongingness to associations in developing countries and mean
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economic freedom. Mean trust in developing countries is not correlated with any of the
other independent variables or with output per worker. Mean belongingness is positively
correlated with mean economic freedom in developing countries.

Table 17: Regression Analysis of Independent Variables on Output per Worker in
Countries (Developed Countries: 39 cases)

Variables
Physical Capital
Human Capital

Model
(1)
.870∗∗∗
(.085)

Model
(2)
.799∗∗∗
(.086)

Model
(3)
.889∗∗∗
(.086)

.379
(.337)

.014
(.351)

.526∗
(.353)

(1990)

Time 3
(2000)

.066
(.332)

.798∗∗
(.334)

Mean Economic
Freedom
Time 2

Model
(4)
.862∗∗∗
(.079)

-.079
(.063)

-.108∗
(.061)

-.080
(.063)

-.057
(.059)

-.092
(.076)

-.173∗∗
(.079)

-.118∗
(.078)

-.143∗∗
(.073)

Mean Trust

-.404
(.311)
.119∗∗
(.045)

Mean
Belongingness
R Square
.82
.80
Adjusted R2
Degree of Freedom 4
F-Value
39.564***

.85
.83
5
37.171***

∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗

.83
.81
5
32.628***

.85
.83
5
38.672***

are used to indicate the level of significance for .001, 05 and .1 respectively. The standard
error is indicated in parentheses for each of the beta values in the model.
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Table 17 (continued)
Variables

Model
(5)
.812∗∗∗
(.082)

Model
(6)
.818∗∗∗
(.086)

Model
(7)
.883∗∗∗
(.074)

Human Capital

-.128
(.343)

.157
(.368)

.141
(.305)

Mean Economic
Freedom

.573∗
(.339)

.768∗∗
(.333)

.244
(.307)

Time 2

-.083∗
(.059)

-.108∗
(.060)

-.056
(.052)

-.191∗∗
(.076)

-.193∗∗
(.080)

-.268∗∗∗
(.069)

-.353
(.293)

-1.043∗∗
(.300)

Physical Capital

(1990)

Time 3
(2000)

Mean Trust
Mean
Belongingness

.093∗∗
(.046)

R Square
.87
2
Adjusted R
.84
Degree of Freedom 6
F-Value
34.526***

.193∗∗∗
(.049)

.86
.83
6
31.645***

.90
.88
7
36.535***

∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗

are used to indicate the level of significance for .001, 05 and .1 respectively. The standard
error is indicated in parentheses for each of the beta values in the model.

Model Analysis and Interpretation: Developed Countries
Model 1: The aggregate production function equation for Table 17: Model 1 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D1T(2) + D2T(3) + e
where Y = Output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D1T(2) = Dummy of Year (1990)
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000), and
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(1)

α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
It was hypothesized that physical capital and human capital are strong positive
determinants of economic growth for both developed and developing nations. The results
of regression analysis for this hypothesis for only developed countries are summarized in
Model 1 (Table 17). Since time was found to be related to the variance in all the
independent variables, Model 1 demonstrates that controlling for time, there is a strong,
direct, positive effect of physical capital on output per worker. Human capital in this
model has a positive direction but is not significant. Time 2 (1990) and Time 3 has a
direct negative effect on output per worker but are not statistically significant.
Furthermore, from the analysis-of-variance table, we can infer that the null hypothesis
that there is no linear relationship between physical capital (independent variable) and the
output per worker (dependent variable) is rejected and that the variation explained by the
model is not due to chance. The results of regression Model 1 provide support for H7 that
physical capital is a strong positive determinant of output per worker for developed
nations. The results provide no support for H8 that human capital is a strong positive
determinant of output per worker for developed nations.

Model 2: The aggregate production function equation for Table 17: Model 2 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D1T(2) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnEF) + e
where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D1T(2) = Dummy of Year (1990)
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000) and
EF = Economic Freedom, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
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(2)

It was hypothesized that mean economic freedom is a strong positive determinant
of economic growth for both developed and developing nations. The results of regression
analysis for this hypothesis are summarized in Model 2. In this model, controlling for
physical capital, human capital, Time 2 (1990) and Time 3 (2000), there is a strong,
direct, positive effect of mean economic freedom on output per worker. Physical capital
in Model 2 is statistically significant and human capital has a positive direction with no
statistical significance in the model. Time 2 (1990) in Model 2 has a direct negative effect
on output per worker and is statistically significant at a higher level. Time 3 (2000) has a
direct negative effect on output per worker and is significant in the model. Also from the
analysis-of-variance table, we know that the null hypothesis that there is no linear
relationship between mean economic freedom and output per worker can be rejected. The
results of regression Model 2 provide support for H9 that mean economic freedom is a
strong positive determinant of economic growth for developed nations. The inclusion of
economic freedom in Model 2 increases the explanatory power of Model 2 relative to
Model 1 on output per worker by (.85 - .82) 3%.

Model 3: The aggregate production function equation for Table 17: Model 3 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D1T(2) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnT) + e
where

Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D1T(2) = Dummy of Year (1990)
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
T = Trust, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
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(3)

In Model 3, controlling for physical capital, human capital, Time 2 and Time 3,
there is a direct, negative effect of trust on output per worker which is not statistically
significant. Physical capital is significant in the model and human capital has a positive
direction with statistical significance at a higher value of p<.1. Time 2 (1990) in Model 3
has a direct negative effect on output per worker but is not statistically significant while
Time 3 (2000) has a direct negative effect on output per worker and is significant at a
higher value of p<.1. Also, from the analysis-of-variance table for Model 3, we know that
the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between mean trust and output per
worker can be rejected. However, the results of regression Model 3 do not provide
support for H10 that mean trust is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for
developed nations.

Model 4: The aggregate production function equation for Table 17: Model 4 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D1T(2) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnB) + e

(4)

where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D1T(2) = Dummy of Year (1990)
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
B = Belongingness, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
In this model, controlling for physical capital, human capital, Time 2 and Time 3,
there is a direct, positive effect of belongingness on output per worker which is
statistically significant. Physical capital is significant in the model and human capital has
a positive direction with no statistical significance. Time 2 (1990) in Model 4 is not
statistically significant while Time 3 (2000) has a direct negative effect on output per
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worker and is significant. The analysis-of-variance table suggests that the null hypothesis
that there is no linear relationship between mean belongingness and output per worker in
developed countries can be rejected. The results of regression Model 4 provide support
for H11 that mean belongingness is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for
developed nations.

Model 5 & 6: The production function equation for Table 17: Model 5 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D1T(2) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnB) + α4 (lnEF) + e

(5)

The aggregate production function equation for Table 17: Model 6 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D1T(2) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnT) + α4 (lnEF) + e

(6)

where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D1T(2) = Dummy of Year (1990)
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
B = Belongingness
EF = Economic Freedom
T = Trust, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
Model 5 summarizes the regression results of mean economic freedom and
belongingness controlling for physical capital, human capital, time 2 (1990) and time 3
(2000) but not trust. In this model, controlling for the above mentioned independent
variables, mean economic freedom is shown to have a direct, positive effect at a higher
level of statistical significance and belongingness is shown to have a direct, positive
effect on output per worker which is statistically significant in the model. Physical capital
is significant in the model and human capital has a negative direction with no statistical
significance. Time 2 (1990) in Model 5 has a direct negative effect but is not statistically
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significant while Time 3 (2000) has a direct negative effect on output per worker and is
significant. Model 6 summarizes the regression results of mean economic freedom and
trust controlling for physical capital, human capital, time 2 (1990) and time 3 (2000) but
not belongingness. Mean economic freedom is shown to have a direct, positive effect
which is significant and trust has a negative direction with no statistical significance on
output per worker.
Physical capital is significant in the model and human capital has a positive direction
with no statistical significance. Time 2 (1990) and Time 3 in Model 6 has a direct
negative effect and is statistically significant.

Model 7: The aggregate production function equation for Table 17: Model 7 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D1T(2) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnT) + α4 (lnEF) + α5 (lnB) + e
(7)
where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D1T(2) = Dummy of Year (1990)
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
B = Belongingness
EF = Economic Freedom
T = Trust, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
In Model 7, physical capital and mean belongingness are both positively and
significantly related to output per worker. Time 3 and mean trust are negatively and
significantly associated with the dependent variable. However, human capital, mean
economic freedom, and time 2 are not related to output per worker. These findings
indicate that the null hypothesis that the independent variables are not linearly related to
the dependent variable can be rejected. But the finding that three of the independent
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variables are not significantly associated with the dependent variable does provide partial
support for the null hypothesis. The regression analyses of developing countries will
follow next.
The regression models which will be used for the developing countries in Table
18 and the models used in the explanation will duplicate the models for that of developed
countries including all the independent variables except time 2 (1990) since it cannot be
used as a dummy variable for the lack of valid cases of developing countries for the years
1980. The production function equations will be developed for each model and a model
comparison between the developed and the developing countries will suggest if there are
significant differences in the independent variables used for predicting output per
workers.
Table 18: Regression Analysis of Independent Variables on Output per Worker in
Countries (Developing Countries: 37 cases)
Variables
Physical Capital
Human Capital

Model
(1)
.746∗∗∗
(.107)

Model
(2)
.696∗∗∗
(.089)

Model
(3)
.719∗∗∗
(.106)

Model
(4)
.742∗∗∗
(.107)

-.004
(.427)

.243
(.359)

.104
(.422)

.043
(.434)

1.126∗∗∗
(.281)

Mean Economic
Freedom
Time 3
(2000)

-.105
(.104)

-.357∗∗∗
(.107)

-.158∗
(.107)

-.170
(.134)

-.776∗
(.486)

Mean Trust
Mean
Belongingness

.080
(.103)
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Table 18 (continued)
R Square
.88
2
.87
Adjusted R
Degree of Freedom 3
F-Value
79.574***
Variables

.92
.91
4
90.956***

.89
.87
4
63.114***

.88
.87
4
59.109***

Model
(5)
.695∗∗∗
(.091)

Model
(6)
.662∗∗∗
(.085)

Human Capital

.255
(.366)

.375
(.342)

.404
(.349)

Mean Economic
Freedom

1.112∗∗∗
(.289)

1.166∗∗∗
(.264)

1.139∗∗∗
(.270)

-.427∗∗∗
(.105)

-.465∗∗∗
(.122)

-.889∗∗
(.388)

-.923∗∗
(.396)

Physical Capital

Time 3
(2000)

-.374∗∗
(.124)

Mean Trust
Mean
Belongingness

.025
(.087)

R Square
.92
2
.91
Adjusted R
Degree of Freedom 5
F-Value
70.690***

Model
(7)
.659∗∗∗
(.086)

.051
(.082)

.93
.92
5
83.485***

.93
.92
6
68.262***

Time 2 (1990) is automatically excluded from the models as 1980 dataset includes only
developed countries.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
are used to indicate the level of significance for .001, 05 and .1 respectively. The standard
error is indicated in parentheses for each of the beta values in the model.

Model Analysis and Interpretation: Developing Countries

Model 1: The aggregate production function equation for Table 18: Model 1 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D2T(3) + e
124

(8)

where Y = Output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000), and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
It was hypothesized that physical capital and human capital are strong positive
determinants of economic growth for developing nations. The results of regression
analysis for this hypothesis for only developing countries are summarized in Model 1
(Table 18). Model 1 demonstrates that controlling for time, there is a strong, direct,
positive effect of physical capital on output per worker. Human capital and Time 3
(2000) in this model is both negative and not significant. In this case, from the analysisof-variance table, we know that the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship
between physical capital (independent variable) and the output per worker (dependent
variable) can be rejected. The results of regression Model 1 provide support for H7 that
physical capital is a strong positive determinant of output per worker for developing
nations. The results provide no support for H8 that human capital is a strong positive
determinant of output per worker for developing nations.

Model 2: The aggregate production function equation for Table 18: Model 2 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnEF) + e
where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000) and
EF = Economic Freedom, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
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(9)

In this model, controlling for physical capital, human capital and Time 3 (2000),
there is a strong, direct, positive effect of mean economic freedom on output per worker.
Physical capital in Model 2 is statistically significant and human capital has a positive
direction with no statistical significance in the model. Time 3 (2000) has a direct negative
effect on output per worker and is significant in the model. The analysis-of-variance table
in Model 2 suggests that the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between
mean economic freedom and output per worker can be rejected. The results of regression
Model 2 provide support for H9 that mean economic freedom is a strong positive
determinant of economic growth for developing nations. The inclusion of economic
freedom in Model 2 increases the explanatory power. Table 18: Model 2 has relatively
better explanatory power than table 18: Model 1 on output per worker by (.92 - .87) 5%.

Model 3: The aggregate production function equation for Table 18: Model 3 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnT) + e

(10)

where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
T = Trust, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
In this model, controlling for physical capital, human capital and Time 3, there is
a direct, negative effect of trust on output per worker which is statistically significant at a
higher level of p-value. Physical capital is significant in the model and human capital has
a positive direction with no statistical significance. Time 3 (2000) has a direct negative
effect on output per worker and is significant. The analysis-of-variance table in Model 3
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suggests that the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between mean trust
and output per worker can be rejected. The results of regression Model 3 thus do not
provide support for H10 that mean trust is a strong positive determinant of economic
growth for developing nations.

Model 4: The aggregate production function equation for Table 18: Model 4 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnB) + e

(11)

where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
B = Belongingness, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
The results of regression analysis for this hypothesis for developing nations are
summarized in Model 4. In this model, controlling for physical capital, human capital and
Time 3, there is a direct, positive effect of belongingness on output per worker which is
not statistically significant. Physical capital is significant in the model. Time 3 (2000) has
a direct negative effect on output per worker and is not significant. The analysis-ofvariance table in Model 4 suggests that the null hypothesis that there is no linear
relationship between mean belongingness and output per worker in developed countries
can be rejected. The results of regression in Table 18: Model 4 do not provide support for
H11 that mean belongingness is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for
developing nations.

Model 5 & 6: The production function equation for Table 18: Model 5 is given as:
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(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnB) + α4 (lnEF) + e

(12)

The aggregate production function equation for Table 18: Model 6 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnT) + α4 (lnEF) + e

(13)

where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
B = Belongingness
EF = Economic Freedom
T = Trust, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
Model 5 summarizes the regression results of mean economic freedom and
belongingness controlling for physical capital, human capital and time 3 (2000) but not
trust. In this model, controlling for the above mentioned independent variables, mean
economic freedom is shown to have a direct, positive effect and is statistically significant
and belongingness is shown to have a positive effect which is statistically significant in
the model. Physical capital is significant in the model. Time 3 (2000) has a direct
negative effect on output per worker and is significant.

Model 6 summarizes the

regression results of mean economic freedom and trust controlling for physical capital,
human capital and time 3 (2000) but not belongingness. In this model, controlling for the
above mentioned independent variables, mean economic freedom is shown to have a
direct, positive effect which is significant and trust has a negative direction which is also
statistically significant on output per worker in the model. Physical capital is significant
in the model. Time 3 (2000) has a direct negative effect on output per worker and is
statistically significant in the model. Both Model 5 and Model 6 have 5 degrees of
freedom and the F-statistics for both these models are significant.
128

Model 7: The aggregate production function equation for Table 18: Model 7 is given as:
(lnY) = α0 + α1 (lnK) + α2 (lnH) + D2T(3) + α3 (lnT) + α4 (lnEF) + α5 (lnB) + e

(14)

where Y = output per worker
K = Physical capital
H = Human capital
D2T(3) = Dummy of Year (2000)
B = Belongingness
EF = Economic Freedom
T = Trust, and
α0 - αn is a vector of coefficients
All the models in Table 18 i.e. Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5,
Model 6 are considered ‘restricted models’ as none of these models control for all the
independent variables. Model 7 is considered to be a full model as all the independent
variables are controlled for in this model. Model 7 tests the direct effects of physical
capital, human capital, mean economic freedom, time 3 (2000), mean trust and mean
belongingness on output per worker. The full model has R square of .93 which suggests
that 93% of the observed variability in output per worker in the model is explained by
controlling for all the independent variables in the model.
In Model 7, physical capital is positive and significant, human capital has a
positive direction but not significant, mean economic freedom has a positive direction but
not significant, time 2 (1990) has a negative direction and is statistically significant, time
3 (2000) has a negative direction and is significant, mean trust has a negative direction
and is significant, mean belongingness has a positive direction but is significant in the
model. The analysis-of-variance table in Model 7 suggests that F statistic of the model is
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significant. This suggests that we can reject the hypothesis that there is no linear
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable and that the
population partial regression coefficients are zero. The explanatory power of variability
in Model 7 is 6% more (.93-.87) relative to Model 1.
It would be useful at the point to check for tests of multicollinearity among the
independent variables. As multiple regression analyses accommodates and even presumes
correlated independent variables, it warrants for checks on multicollinearity. Kennedy
(1979) points out that correlations of .8 or higher can be problematic from the point of
view of multicollinearity. As a test of multicollinearity, the tolerance level and the
variance inflation factor (VIF) is examined for each of the independent variables for both
regression Table 17 (with developed countries: 39 cases) and regression Table 18 (with
developing countries: 37 cases). The results of multicollinearity tests are given below:
Table 19: Multicollinearity diagnostics for Regression Table 17 (Developed Countries:
39 cases)
Multicollinearity Statistics of Independent Variables

a

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance
VIF
.573
Physical Capital
1.746
Human Capital
.416
2.402
Time 2 (1990)
1.991
.502
Time 3 (2000)
.322
3.110
3.107
Economic Freedom
.322
Trust
.481
2.078
Belongingness
2.899
.345
a. Dependent Variable - Output per Worker
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Table 20: Multicollinearity diagnostics for Regression Table 18 (Developing Countries:
37 cases)
Multicollinearity Statistics of Independent Variables

Physical Capital
Human Capital
Time 3 (2000)
Economic Freedom
Trust
Belongingness

a

Collinearity Statistics
VIF
Tolerance
5.128
.195
5.315
.188
.417
2.400
.632
1.581
.875
1.143
.569
1.757

a. Dependent Variable: Output per Worker

The multicollinearity in Table 19 shows that the VIF for all the independent
variables are less than 4. The largest VIF in the table is 3.1 which suggest that for Table
19, multicollinearity is not a problem. Tolerance level is the reciprocal of VIF.
Multicollinearity is indicated if the tolerance level is below .1 and the VIF of the mean of
all the independent variables is over 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995).
Table 20 also suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem for independent variables
used for regression Table 18 for developing countries.

Summary results of the regression hypotheses:
H7: Physical capital is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both
developed and developing nations.
Physical capital is a strong positive determinant of economic growth as the p-value<.001
for the regression coefficients of physical capital is observed for all the seven models in
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Table 17 and all the seven models in Table 18. This physical capital is unequivocally a
strong determinant for economic growth for both developed and developing countries.
H8: Human capital is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both
developed and developing nations.
In 6 of the 7 models in Table 17, human capital has a positive direction but is not
significant in the models. In 6 of the 7 models in Table 18, human capital has a positive
direction but is not significant in the models. However, this does not mean that human
capital is not a positive determinant of growth. Probably, the control variables that are
most effective to be included with human capital are not present in the models for which
it is not significant.
H9: Economic Freedom is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both
developed and developing nations.
Table 17: Model 2, Model 5, Model 6 and Model 7 include the effects of mean economic
freedom controlling for other independent variables. In all 3 models in table 17 – Model
2, Model 5 and Model 6, economic freedom is a significant determinant of economic
growth in developed countries. In Model 5, it is significant at a higher p<.1
In Table 18: Model 2, Model 5, Model 6 and Model 7, mean economic freedom is seen to
be a strong positive determinant of economic growth significant at p<.001. This
demonstrates that both for developed and developing countries, mean economic freedom
is a positive determinant of growth.
H10: Trust is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both developed and
developing nations.
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Table 17: Model 3, Model 6 and Model 7 shows that trust has a negative effect of output
per worker. In Model 3 and Model 6, it is not significant, but controlling for all the other
independent variables, it becomes significant in Model 7 at p<.05.
Table 18: Model 3, Model 6 and Model 7 shows that trust has a negative effect of output
per worker. In Model 3, trust is negative and significant at p<.1 while in Model 6 and
Model 7, trust is negative and significant at p<.05. This shows that trust is a strong
negative determinant of output per worker in both developed and developing countries.
Thus the hypothesis of trust as a strong positive determinant of growth is rejected,
H11: Belongingness is a strong positive determinant of economic growth for both
developed and developing nations.
Table 17: Model 4, Model 5 and Model 7 shows that belongingness is positive and
significant for these models. In Model 4 and Model 5, belongingness is significant at
p<.05 and in Model 7, it is significant at p<.000.
Table 18: Model 4, Model 5 and Model 7 shows that belongingness has a positive
direction but is not significant in any of the models. Thus the hypothesis results are split
between developed and developing countries. Belongingness is a strong positive
determinant of output per worker in developed countries but it is not a significant
determinant of output per worker in developing countries. Table 19 summarizes the status
of the research hypotheses following the research findings.

133

Table 19: Summary of the Tests of Hypothesis
Hypothesis

Result

H1: Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is
Accepted
positively associated with increased scores in the
area of legal structure and security of property
rights within economic freedom.
H2: Increase in mean trust as a social capital measure is
Accepted
associated with increased scores in the area of
access to sound money within economic freedom.
H3: Increase in mean trust is associated with increased
Accepted
scores in the area of freedom to trade internationally
within economic freedom.
H4: Increase in mean trust is associated with increase in Mixed results which vary with
mean belongingness/membership in social groups.
time
H5: Increase in mean trust is associated with decrease in Qualified disconnect between
mean belongingness/membership in social groups. trust and belongingness in time
H6: Increase in mean belongingness/membership has
Partially accepted. Split results
positive association with the size of the government, for correlation for mean trust
legal structure and security of property rights, access and mean belongingness
to sound money, regulation of credit, labor and
business and mean economic freedom.
H7: Physical capital is a strong positive determinant of
Accepted
economic growth for both developed and developing
nations.
H8: Human capital is a strong positive determinant of
Rejected but the importance
economic growth for both developed and developing of other relevant control
nations.
variables mentioned
H9: Economic Freedom is a strong positive determinant
Accepted
of economic growth for both developed and
developing nations.
H10: Trust is a strong positive determinant of economic Rejected: Trust is a negative
growth for both developed and developing nations. and significant determinant
H11: Belongingness is a strong positive determinant of
Partially accepted: Split
economic growth for both developed and
results for developed
developing nations.
versus developing countries

134

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Research Findings, Theories and Discussions
The classical economists identified three factors of economic growth as land,
labor and physical capital. Physical capital as a primary determinant of labor productivity
has been a part of both the models proposed by Harrod-Domar and Solow. For the
purpose of this research, physical capital has been taken as the total investment (in forms
such as monetary investment, infrastructural investment, investment in machinery etc)
going into labor productivity. Following the works of classical and neo-classical
economists, a wide number of researches have pointed to the explanatory power of
physical capital. McKinsey (1996) argued that “Higher capital productivity translates into
higher financial returns for U.S. savers – 9.1 percent compared with 7.4 percent in
Japan”. The World Development Report (1995) even emphasizes the greater importance
of physical capital in explaining economic growth than human capital in multiple
countries although it urges countries to have an optimum combination of multiple
important variables for long-term growth. It is therefore a very expected finding that
physical capital has been unequivocally strong and significant in determining labor
productivity or output per worker in all the models for both developed and developing
countries.
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Although human capital mostly has a positive direction in the models, it is not a
significant determinant of economic growth in the models. This is not to say that human
capital is not theoretically a strong positive significant of economic growth Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) have actually demonstrated in an augmented model, the
universality of human capital as a determinant of long-term growth. Therefore, although
human capital has a positive correlation with output per worker, some probable reasons
for human capital not being significant in the models may be due to the fact that it has
stronger impact on long-term growth, which is not being measured here or it is not
considered in isolation from physical capital which seemingly overpowers human capital
in the model.
The mean economic freedom variable has been observed to be strong and positive
determinant of output per worker in both developed and developing countries. Both
country-level data and state/province level data (in United States and Canada) on
economic freedom and economic growth has shown that economic freedom is a strong
positive determinant of economic growth (Karabegovic, Samida, Schlegel and McMohan,
2003). Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report suggests findings that
“nations in the top quintile in economic freedom have an average per capita GDP of
$25,062 compared to $2,409 for those nations in the bottom quintile”. Regarding the
relationship of economic freedom and economic growth in countries, it points out that
“the top quintile has an average per-capita economic growth of 2.5, compared to 0.6% for
the bottom quintile”.
In addition to the invariable findings of strong, positive determining power of
economic freedom on per capita growth, the interesting finding that the current research
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focuses on is the link between economic freedom and two measures of social capital.
There are significant and important correlations between trust, belongingness to different
kinds of organizations and areas of economic freedom. It is particularly interesting to me
that ‘trust’ is negatively correlated with size of the government, a fact that can be further
researched for public policy implications. A similar line of thinking in this regard is how
economic freedom does not take into account the broad understanding of social situation
measures of a country, as Robert Kuttner (1997) has pointed out. A very interesting line
of research can begin here.
It must be mentioned that the trust variable considered in the study is a limited
variable in the sense that the question asked in World Values Survey is “Can most people
be trusted?” and the responses to this item are binary types: “yes” and “you can’t be too
careful”. For practical purposes, this does not allow investigation into the nature and
types of trust or the degree of trustfulness displayed by people. This variable tells us that
in general, personal trust has negative effects on output per worker. This variable is more
akin to “generalized trust”, a term used by social researchers. However, unlike
“generalized trust” which captures different degrees of trustfulness among people, this
variable is limited. I would thus categorize this variable as “personal trust” variable. This
kind of category will help us understand the results of trust and growth in other current
researches.
Research conducted on samples from two minority regions in Russia show that
the willingness to trust strangers is associated with receiving public benefits characteristic
of a responsible and people-oriented government and that such ‘generalized trust’ is
stronger in ethnically homogeneous societies than in more diverse societies which breed
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more in-group, particularistic trust. (Bahry, Kosopalov, Kozyreva and Wilson; 2005).
Thus the findings in my study that Sweden, Norway, Finland which has more ethnically
homogeneous societies has higher mean trust that the United States is understandable. A
number of researchers have pointed out that social trust is an outcome of at least two
interrelated types of equality – economic equality and equality of opportunity. Both these
equalities are policy-oriented (Rothstein and Uslaner; 2005), therefore, trust is a function
of the “universalistic policies” of the government. From this, we can infer that societies
where government involvement in public life is more in terms of universalistic policy,
reduction of economic inequality, extending of opportunities are likely to have higher
degrees of “generalized” trust. A contrasting perspective is shown by a number of
demographers who have argued the premise that trust is provincial; therefore
measurement of mean trust at the country-level may not be accurate enough to point to
wide-scale generalizations on trust. Based on GSS 2003 on Social Engagement in
Canada, Grant Schellenberg (2004) argues that trust, belongingness and confidence in
institutions in Canada are provincial e.g. only 35% of Quebec residents said that people
can be trusted compared to 60% of the people in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince
Edwards Island and other western provinces. However, a recent finding from 54 regions
in Europe (Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik; 2005) fails to support the hypothesis that
economic growth is positively associated with trust in European regions.
Going back into the correlation between “personal trust” and other independent
variables and output per worker, this research points out that trust has been declining over
the years. In 1980, the mean trust of countries was 1.4 while in 2000, the mean trust fell
to 1.2. Also mean trust was found positively associated with labor unions and both mean
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trust and labor unions were found to be negatively associated with size of the government
(area 1 in economic freedom). Furthermore, trust in 1980 was associated with mean
belongingness to all social groups except religious groups while in 2000, mean trust was
associated only with mean belongingness to labor unions and sports/youth organizations.
Here, there is clearly a disconnect between “personal trust” and belongingness and what
becomes apparent is that negative “personal trust” is related indirectly to economic
growth (correlation between the two is positive but controlling for other independent
variables in regression models, it becomes negative) but directly to different kinds of
belongingness, governmental policies and time.
Now, taking a look at the broader theoretical picture, it would be worthy to point
out two different kinds of socio-historical happenings taking place in developed and
developing countries associated both with declining “personal trust” or “generalized
trust” and pointing to its interrelations with the other variables discussed in the previous
paragraphs. If we agree with Fukuyama (1995) that in increasingly capitalistic societies
“the economy is a realm in which individuals……satisfy their selfish needs and desires
before retreating back into their “real” social lives”, then the declining trust is a straightjacket explanation of capitalism and globalization in developed societies. This is a part
and parcel of many theories especially that of Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) Worldsystems theory which posits that the “core” countries which have always maintained
hegemony over the periphery, in the age of globalization shows increasing capital
accumulation and strengthening of the local bourgeoisie and the elitist government which
takes trust away from the majority people. This research concurs with the position that
current trends in globalization where smaller size of the government is increasingly
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bringing market forces into prominent play, is no longer representative of the workers’
interest (who are the main sources of generating output as growth). This theoretical
position is in agreement with the ‘competition paradigm’ of Porter (1990) which argues
that the cornerstone of productivity taking every social aspect into account is laid out by
not what industries a nation competes with but “how” it does so which is linked to the
size of the government.
The scenario in the developing societies is different from that of developed
societies. The trust fabric in these societies which has been originally destroyed through
several periods of military colonization is now being penetrated by new industrial
colonization dominated by a market economy. The so called resource-drained ‘thirdworld’ has become a new seat of exploitation for the native rulers in alliance with the
international bourgeoisie using Wallerstein’s terminologies. Constant exploitation and
inroads made by foreign technology in a global world driven to profit takes away the
element of “personal trust” among people which is possible in the simpler forms of
societies with much less conflicting interests and diversities in inequalities. Bowen
(1996) makes a strong point when he says that the concept of ethnic territory has ever
been on the rise in east Europe, Asia and Africa in the aftermath of colonial
discrimination against native groups than in periods before.

This kind of political

instability coupled with corrupt government systematically destroys “generalized” and
“personal trust” among people. The argument of my research is not that “personal trust”
is not possible in today’s society as much as it is that the social fabric for generating that
trust has been corroded and erupted in both developed and developing societies with
conflicts, fractions, inequalities, corruptions and profit-mindedness.
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Regarding the function of belongingness and its effects on economic growth,
research

is

less

clear

findings

than

with

respect

to

trust.

Research

on

belongingness/membership shows different trends in the effects of belongingness on
economic growth. Putnam et al. (1993) argue the positive effects of civic group
membership based on the premise that “citizens in a civic community, though not selfless
saints, regard the public domain as more than a battleground for pursuing personal
interest’. In this manner, fewer resources are used in the process of transaction costs and
in the utilization of public goods.
Arguably, the debate around belongingness and economic growth is not whether it
promotes economic growth, but the kind of belongingness, the importance of different
associational activities, the meaning of belongingness, and belongingness versus belief
that promotes economic growth. The nature of this debate will be clearer from the various
research findings presented here. In the area of one sector of belongingness, namely
religious belongingness, cross-country panel data collected in six international surveys
between 1981 and 1999 summarizes the argument that given religious beliefs rather than
church attendance increases economic growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003). The beliefs
are thought to be output of the religious sector while church attendance, thought to be an
input to the sector depresses economic growth by using up excess physical capital. Knack
and Keefer (1997) makes distinctions between different types of associational activity
that can have different impacts on economic growth. Olson (1984) points out that some
kinds of associational activities may actually promote rent-seeking and lobbying for
preferential interest-driven policies which diminishes economic growth.
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Current findings in my research show a clear divide between the impact of
belongingness on economic growth between developed and developing countries.
Controlling for all the independent variables in the research, belongingness is shown to
have positive effect on economic growth in developed countries which is in agreement
with Putnam’s thesis of positive effect of belongingness on economic growth.
Regarding the negative impact of belongingness on economic growth (which was
not significant in the current study) or the lack thereof, of positive impact may be due to
the fact that belongingness in these societies is less formalized and works differently
through kinship-based networks. Thus, the current measure of belongingness in different
organizations used for developed countries may not be rightly applicable in the context of
developing societies. Interestingly, researchers have pointed out that in developing
societies, not only kinship based networks flourish more, but men’s networks are
different from women’s networks and consist of more co-workers and non-kin members
and less neighbors (Moore, 1990; Lin, 2000) – thus different social groups have
differential access and limitations regarding social capital in the developing societies. In
this regard, there have been strong arguments that all forms of social capital are not equal
and only certain forms of social capital are appropriate at certain stages of economic
growth and development (Fedderke, Kadt and Luiz, 1999).
The other competing thesis regarding belongingness in the developing societies
follows an extension of the World-systems theory premises that the matrix of
belongingness in these societies has been critically changed in the aftermath of
colonization. Research in Botswana has shown that membership here is not driven
towards the idea of equality of economic opportunities and entitlements which are the
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primary benefits associated with social capital but towards gaining exclusionary political
status and citizen identity to maintain the colonial hierarchy of ethnic groupings
(Nyamnjoh, 2002). Bowen (1996) has pointed out that in all developing societies, which
are the products of past colonies, groupings reflect political interests of the state
machinery to act in concert for “political autonomy, access to education and jobs, and
control of local resources”. He says that that this is true of “Sikhs in India, Maronites in
Lebanon, Copts in Egypt, Moluccans in the Dutch East Indies, Karens in Burma” – thus
social groupings in developing societies are argued to be politically driven rather than
being reflective of true social forces. In this case, it is not surprising that highly
politicized belongingness then has negative effects on productivity of nations as can be
seen in the context of the current research.

Contributions in terms of research and theory
1) One of the contributions of this research is that it has broadened the boundary of
economic growth research. In contrast with capital accumulation theories –
classical or augmented – the current work takes into account the important
cultural factors, in particular social capital variables in explaining economic
growth models.
2) The current work emphasizes the importance of globalization in understanding
economic growth models. Working against the idea “one-size-fits-all”,
globalization is understood to create both homogeneities and differences among
developed and developing countries. The fact that cultural and political values can
be important and decisive factors for economic growth in the age of globalization
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is laid out by showing the interrelations between different areas of government
(economic freedom), social capital measures and economic growth. In this aspect,
it is interesting that trust in societies have been shown to have a moderately high
negative correlation with size of the government, an aspect of public policy
worthy of attention.
3) The research findings have synthesized a wide array of past research – in this
sense, it is a continuum in the understanding of social capital variables in social
science research. While trust and belongingness have been understood to be
separate measures of social capital, they have also been understood to be
interrelated. With globalization and the rational calculation of the opportunity cost
of belongingness, there is an increasing disconnect between the two. One
interesting thought in this regard is that people cannot be paid to be trusted but
they can be paid for different memberships, thus belongingness can continue to
increase in developed societies and have positive effects on growth while trust can
continue to show a completely opposite trend.
4) The research brings into view that belongingness/memberships in formal
organizations may not be an accurate measure of social capital for developing
societies as these societies still seem to function on the bases of extended kinship
networks and much less formalized institutions. So, the point of emphasis here
would be to understand that the meaning of belongingness and membership in
different societies might be very different in nature and quality in different
societies.

144

5) Theoretically, the research brings together two opposite traditions – that of neoclassical economics with world-systems’ theory fathered by Immanuel
Wallerstein. In traditional growth literature, no attention has been paid to the
paradigms of military colonization, exploitation and industrial colonization which
affects different societal components such as relationships of trust or happiness
among people. Economic growth has been eulogized as the ‘be-all’ and ‘end-all’
of a model society and in this regard, the current research finding points contrarily
to the costs of high-growth societies in terms of people’s trust.
6) The research has a few indirect implications regarding economic and public
policies of government, factors that continue to be part of a larger political debate
in the age of increasing globalization and outsourcing. Rather than accepting
economic freedom as a blanket term for greater economic growth, different policy
aspects of economic freedom have been shown to have different relationships
with both trust and belongingness.

Limitations and suggestion for future research
There are a few limitations in this research. Data-wise, 1980 includes only
developed countries because of the limitations of matching cross-country data in the three
different datasets considered in this research. A more productive but tedious task in this
regard would be to get a balance between developed and developing countries for the
year 1980 by including national level data on social capital from government and private
sources.

145

The measure of “trust” in this research is very limited. Although the standard
question used to assess the level of “trust” at the regional level and the individual level
has been formulated by a question as: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” (Knack
and Keefer, 1997), I have felt while conducting this research that this measure of “trust”
which I call “personal trust” is not a good measure to predict wide-scale generalizations
regarding the trust variable. Social researchers have pointed out that this measure of trust
actually does not measure trust but trustworthiness. Since trust is a key concept in the
understanding of social capital, the ground logic and the construction of this measure
need to be worked on as this study has pointed out to the real limitations of this variable.
The ‘trust’ variable, it seems works concomitantly with a few other significant
variables e.g. institutional functioning, equality of distributions, public policy measures,
perception of corruptions and others and in order to get a more comprehensive
understanding of the ‘trust’ variable, these control variables need to be taken into account
to check model improvements. A number of studies have shown that the potential gains
on output per worker and investment over GDP from eliminating perceived corruption
and increasing social capital are significantly large (Mauro, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999).
One important idea that results from this for future research is the inclusion of other
relevant control variables that act concomitantly with trust in testing the effect of trust on
output per worker.
It has already been pointed out in the previous sections that belongingness to
formal associations like welfare, religion, arts, education, political parties etc. may not be
truly reflective of developing societies since these societies experience less presence of
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these institutions and more presence of kinship-based networks. Further studies can test
the effect of associations in informal institutions on economic growth in developing
societies.
Continuing along these lines, further distinctions need to be made between
different kinds of membership in different societies that potentially generate social capital
e.g. the membership unions in Nigeria are not comparable to memberships in hunting
associations in Finland or obligatory memberships in professional associations in
Denmark (Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005). It would be useful to make observations
as to what kinds of belongingness/membership in one society translate to another kind of
belongingness/membership in another society. Also, earlier studies suggest (Lin, 2000)
that kinship-networks in developing societies have differential impacts based on age, sex,
region and other demographic factors – these inputs need to be incorporated in further
research on the effects on informal institutional and kinship networks on growth in
developing societies.
Future research should also focus on the mechanisms on the bases of which social
capital in terms of associational activities influence economic growth in both developed
and developing countries. In other words, not only does belongingness need to be
considered in cultural context, but also the associational activities associated with social
capital that potentially generate more output or depresses output need to be explored. In
this context, Putnam et al. has suggested that in different parts of Italy, regional
performance in the economy is determined by different levels and functions of
associational activities. The argument is that in regions where social relationships are
more horizontal, regional governments are more successful in fostering greater networks
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of civic engagement, greater organization and community membership in activities
(Putnam et al, 1993). This is essentially in agreement with the idea I proposed in the
preceding paragraph that the nature, quality and importance of belongingness is regional,
therefore regional-level belongingness/membership can be explored in depth that may
actually explain more variability in regional economic growth than country-level data.
In this research, I have looked at economic growth looking at cross-country panel data at
three different points in time: 1980, 1990 and 2000. This strategy of looking at growth
did not capture the change in growth as reflective of changes in the other independent
variables. A study could be formulated where changes in economic growth could be
evaluated from the perspective of changes in physical capital, human capital, economic
freedom, trust and belongingness to compare if the same variables which significantly
determine output at each single point of time are also relevant to capture changes in
growth over constant differences in time e.g. a decade.
The other related deficiency of this research is that the mean of economic freedom
variable considered as an independent variable has actually suppressed the fluctuations
within the five areas and sub-areas with twenty-nine sub-components. From a public
policy perspective, it would be worthy to examine the changes related to different aspect
of policy e.g. taxation, public expenditures, government subsidy in industries that
determine changes in growth controlling for the independent variables in this research. It
has already been argued (Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson 2004) that EFW index as the
sole measure of institutional quality explains 63.2% of the variation in cross-country
GDP. The new direction of research would be to show the internal changes in sub-area
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rankings reflecting changes in public policy that affect change in output when controlled
for social capital.
It would be pertinent to look into the philosophical meaning of social capital,
which despite differences in definition has the same common denominator of stability in
its definition. From this perspective, it would be interesting to see the effects of social
capital on economic development rather than economic growth, the latter which is
understood to be quick, instant and does not take into account values of social equality
that development does. The estimated effects of social capital on economic welfare (as
opposed to economic growth) have actually been shown to be larger than human capital
(Grootaert, 1999; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) but these studies focus only on selected
communities in nations and have no confirmation at the national or country-level data.
Further studies developed along these lines could empirically and philosophically justify
why social capital is more relevant to explain development (the idea is to consider human
development index) rather than economic growth models which are short-run, nonegalitarian models. Development takes into account all the aspects of economic growth
and more as can be observed from the construction of the Human Development Index of
the United Nations, therefore, a good research proposal can be built around the concept of
human development to see the impact of social capital and economic freedom on this
indicator.
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